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Abstract. This paper attempts to explain the emergence of the logical em-
piricist philosophy of space and time as a collision of mathematical traditions.
The historical development of the “Riemannian” and “Helmholtzian” tradi-
tions in 19th century mathematics is investigated. Whereas Helmholtz’s insis-
tence on rigid bodies in geometry was developed group theoretically by Lie and
philosophically by Poincaré, Riemann’s Habilitationsvotrag triggered Christof-
fel’s and Lipschitz’s work on quadratic differential forms, paving the way to
Ricci’s absolute differential calculus. The transition from special to general
relativity is briefly sketched as a process of escaping from the Helmholtzian
tradition and entering the Riemannian one. Early logical empiricist conven-
tionalism, it is argued, emerges as the failed attempt to interpret Einstein’s
reflections on rods and clocks in general relativity through the conceptual re-
sources of the Helmholtzian tradition. Einstein’s epistemology of geometry
should, in spite of his rhetorical appeal to Helmholtz and Poincaré, be under-
stood in the wake the Riemannian tradition and of its aftermath in the work
of Levi-Civita, Weyl, Eddington, and others.
1. Introduction
In an influential paper, John Norton (1999) has suggested that general relativity
might be regarded as the result of a “collision of geometries” or, better, of geo-
metrical strategies. On the one hand, Riemann’s “additive strategy,” which makes
sure that no superfluous elements enter into the initial setting and then progres-
sively obtains the actual geometry of space as the result of a progressive enrichment
of structure. On the other hand Klein’s “subtractive strategy,” in which, on the
contrary, one starts “with all bells and whistles and then strips away all elements
deemed to be descriptive fluff only” (Janssen, 2005, 61)
This paper intends to show that the emergence of the early logical empiri-
cists’ philosophy of space and time might be seen as the result of a cognate,
but less successful, “collision” of two geometrical traditions that might be la-
beled the “Helmholtzian” and the “Riemannian” traditions. Logical empiricist
neo-conventionalism is nothing but the result of the attempt to interpret the philo-
sophical novelty of general relativity, the very “triumph” (Einstein, 1915, 778) of
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the Riemannian tradition in Einstein’s own account, by resorting to the conceptual
resources shaped by the Helmholtzian one. Fascinated by Helmholtz’s approach
to geometry based on the independence of the congruence of bodies from position,
what the logical empiricists neglected to appreciate was that Riemann’s assump-
tion of the independence of the length of lines from position was the relevant issue
(Torretti, 1983).
This paper is divided into three parts. In the first part (§§2; 3), the main
line of Riemann’s (§2.1) and Helmholtz’s (§2.2) contributions to geometry are
sketched and their development into different line of evolutions is investigated:
if Lie and Poincaré developed the group theoretical and philosophical implications
of Helmholtz’s work (§3.1), Riemann’s insight found its expression in the non-
geometrical work of Christoffel, Lipschitz (§2.2), Ricci and Levi-Civita (§3.2) that
led to the formulation of the absolute differential calculus.
In the second part of this paper, (§4, the passage form special to general rel-
ativity is presented as an escape from the Helmholtzian tradition (§4.1) and an
appropriation of the conceptual tools of the Riemannian one (§4.2). It was only af-
ter general relativity that the geometrical content of this tradition was rediscovered
by Levi-Civita, and implemented by Weyl in space–time physics (§4.3).
The third part of this paper, (§§5; 6; 7), will show how the standard logical
empiricists’ (Schlick’s and most of all Reichenbach’s) philosophy of space and time
emerged in the attempt to interpret general relativity in the light of Helmholtz’s
and Poincaré’s philosophy of geometry (§§5.1; 5.3; 5.4; 6.2), partly misled by some
ambiguous remarks of Einstein himself (§§5.2; 6.1). Neglecting the group theoreti-
cal implications of Helmholtz’s and Poincaré’s work, logical empiricists considered
their discussion of the role of rigid bodies in the foundations of geometry (the repro-
ducibility of congruent figures at a distance), as the right philosophical framework
to understand the role of rods and clocks in general relativity. However, rods and
clocks in Einstein’s theory represent the counterpart of a central feature of Rie-
mannian geometry as such (the reproducibility of the unit of length at a distance),
that Weyl and Eddington had proposed to drop (§7).
This paper hopes to show that the role of Helmholtz and Poincaré in the his-
torical and systematical discussion of space–time theory has been overestimated
among philosophers of science. Also recent historically accurate and philosophi-
cally influential works, such as those of Michael Friedman (from Friedman, 2001 to
Friedman, 2010) or Robert DiSalle (DiSalle, 2006) have analyzed the developments
of scientific philosophy in the 19th century, from Kant to Einstein, precisely along
a line in which Helmholtz and Poincaré are the main protagonists. The historical
reconstruction that we suggest in the present paper should contribute to show that
the philosophical problems raised by Einstein’s theory can be properly understood
from the point a view of what we have labeled the Riemannian tradition, from the
less accessible works of authors such as Christoffel, Lipschitz, Ricci, etc., to which
historians of the philosophy of science have granted far too little attention.
2. Riemann, Helmholtz and the Birth of the 19th Century Debate on
the Foundations of Geometry
2.1. Riemann’s Habilitationsvortrag and its Analytic Development in
the Commentatio Mathematica. Bernhard Riemann’s Ueber die Hypothesen,
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welche der Geometrie zu Grunde liegen—a lecture given in 1854 to fulfill the require-
ments of promotion to Privatdozent—was discovered in the late 1860s by Dedekind,
to whom Riemann’s wife had handed over the her husband’s Nachlass. As Rie-
mann’s preparatory notes reveal (Scholz, 1982), his intention was to “build all
geometry” without resorting to “any spatial intuition” (cited in Scholz, 1982, 228).
Space might be regarded as a special case of the abstract concept of a continu-
ous n-dimensional manifold (Scholz, 1979), in which, roughly, every single element
is identified by means of n variables x1, x2, x3, . . . , xn that can assume the “the
continuous series of all possible number values [Zahlenwerthe] from −∞ to +∞”
(cited in Scholz, 1982, 228). The system of colors (Riemann, 1854/1868, 135; tr.
1873, 15), as generated as mixtures of three basic colors, can be considered as an-
other example of a three-dimensional manifold, whereas sounds, defined by their
continuously changing pitch and volume, can be seen as being the elements of a
two-dimensional manifold.
Having introduced the notion of a continuous manifold of n dimensions, Rie-
mann’s next problem was to investigate the measure relations of which such a
manifold is capable (Scholz, 1992), that is, the possibility of comparing “[d]efinite
portions of a manifold, distinguished by a mark or by a boundary” (which Riemann
calls “quanta”) with one another (Riemann, 1854/1868, 135; tr. 1873, 15).
The comparison with regard to quantity in a continuous manifold happens through
measurement. Measurement involves the “superposition of the quantities to be com-
pared” [einem Aufeinanderlegen der zu vergleichenden Grössen] (Riemann, 1854/1868,
135; tr. 1873, 15). It must be possible to transport one quantity to be used “as
a measuring rod [als Massstab]” (Riemann, 1854/1868, 135; tr. 1873, 15) for the
others so that the ratio between the magnitude of every quantity and a given unit
magnitude of the same kind can be determined univocally. Without the possibility
“of transporting a certain manifold as a measuring rod on another” (cited in Scholz,
1982, 228) one could compare two manifolds “only when one is part of the other,
and then only as to more or less, not as how much” (Riemann, 1854/1868, 140; tr.
1873, 15) with respect to a given standard of length. In other words, if measurement
must be possible, then magnitudes must be regarded as “existing independently of
position” and “expressible in terms of a unit” (Riemann, 1854/1868, 135; tr. 1873,
15).
According to Riemann, space has a feature that distinguishes it from other pos-
sible continuous manifolds. In space, the magnitude of any piece of a manifold of
one dimension can be compared with any other, or, as Riemann famously put it,
“the length of lines is independent of their position and consequently every line is
measurable by means of every other” (Riemann, 1854/1868, 138; tr. 1873, 15), that
is, it can be expressed as a multiple or a fraction of every other. In contrast, in the
manifold of colors there is no relation between any two arbitrary colors that would
correspond to the distance between any two points in space, nor can one compare
a difference of pitch with a difference of volume in the manifold of sounds.
In space, there is instead a distance between any pair of arbitrary points, which
can be expressed as a function of their coordinates. Inspired by “the celebrated
memoir of Gauss, Disqusitiones generales circa superficies curvas” (Gauss, 1828),
Riemann famously assumed the hypothesis (the simplest among the other possible
alternatives) that the distance between any two arbitrarily closed points, the so
called line element ds, is equal to “the square root of an always positive integral
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homogeneous function of the second order of the quantities dx, in which the coeffi-
cients are continuous functions of the quantities x” (Riemann, 1854/1868, 140; tr.
1873, 16; cf. Libois, 1957; Scholz, 1992).
The length of an arbitrary path connecting two points can then be calculated as
the integral
´
ds, that is, by adding together the lengths of the infinitesimal portions
into which the line may be decomposed. More precisely, the equality of line-lengths
corresponds to the equality of such integrals, so that the relative ratios of any
two lengths are uniquely represented. Multiplying all length by a positive constant
causes the values to change to a different unit of measure without upsetting relative
ratios of lengths. Hence, once a unit of length has been stipulated, the numerical
value of the length of an arbitrary line may be determined “in a manner wholly
independent of the choice of independent variables” (Riemann, 1854/1868, 140; tr.
1873, 16).
The coefficients of the quadratic expression depend indeed on a particular choice
of such variables, but, regardless of the system of variable used, the length of a
line is always assigned the same value. As Riemann points out, every such ex-
pression can be in fact transformed “into another similar one if we substitute for
the n independent variables functions of n new independent variables” (Riemann,
1854/1868, 140; tr. 1873, 16), leaving “unaltered the length of lines.” However, as
he immediately emphasizes, “we cannot transform any expression into any other”
(Riemann, 1854/1868, 140; tr. 1873, 16).
In particular it is not always possible to transform every expression into one “in
which the line element may be reduced to the form
√∑
dx2” (Riemann, 1854/1868,
141; tr. 1873, 16; for more details Portnoy, 1982; Zund, 1983), that is, the manifolds
that Riemann calls “flat,” where “the position of points” might be “expressed by
rectilinear co-ordinates” (Riemann, 1854/1868, 140; tr. 1873, 16). Hence, when
“the line-element . . . is no longer reducible to the form of the square root of a sum
of squares” (Riemann, 1854/1868, 140; tr. 1873, 16), this might be interpreted as
a “deviation from flatness,” just like a “sphere . . . cannot be changed into a plane
without stretching” (Riemann, 1854/1868, 140; tr. 1873, 16; cf. Farwell and Knee,
1992).
In the 1861 Commentatio mathematica—which Dedekind also found in the Nach-
lass (Riemann, 1861/1876, tr. Farwell, 1990, 240-253)—Riemann developed the for-
mal tools for discerning the geometrical properties that do not depend on the choice
of the independent variables from those that are a mere appearance introduced by
the special variables one has chosen (Farwell, 1990). In particular—answering a
question on heat conduction for a prize offered by the French Academy of Sciences—
Riemann investigated under which conditions a positive definite quadratic differ-
ential form
∑
aι,ι′dxιdxι′ with non-constant coefficients could be transformed into∑
ι
dx2ι with constant coefficients by a mere change of the independent variables
(Zund, 1983). Thus the four-index symbol (ιι′, ι′′ι′′′)—containing the first and the
second partial derivatives of the functions aι,ι′ with respect to the coordinates—
turned out to furnish an objective mathematical criterion: when it vanishes, the
non-constancy of the coefficients ai,i′ (which in this context correspond to the con-
ductivity coefficients of the body) is merely an artifact of the system of variables
chosen, if not, the non-constancy expresses a real difference.
As Riemann observes, although in passing, the expression
√∑
aι,ι′dxιdxι′ “can
be regarded as a line element in a more general space of n dimensions extending
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beyond the bounds of our intuition (Riemann, 1861/1876, 435, tr. Farwell, 1990,
252). Quadratic differential forms that can be transformed into one another by a
mere change of variables leaving the line element unchanged represent the same
geometry. Thus the four-index symbol (ιι′, ι′′ι′′′) corresponds geometrically to “the
measure of curvature” (Riemann, 1861/1876, 435, tr. Farwell, 1990, 252). We have
thus to differentiate the aι,ι′ twice before we arrive at a geometrical property that
has a significance independent of any special coordinate system.
Whereas such variation in the aι,ι′ might be neglected in small enough regions
of space—a property that Riemann calls “flatness in the smallest parts” (Riemann,
1854/1868, 143; tr. 1873, 16)—, over larger regions, “the curvature at each point
may have an arbitrary value in three directions” (Riemann, 1854/1868, 149; tr.
1873, 37). Spaces of constant curvature, that are “exactly the same in all directions
at one point as at another” (Riemann, 1854/1868, 145; tr. 1873, 37), are merely a
special case, where “not merely an existence of lines independent of position, but
of bodies” is assured (Riemann, 1854/1868, 149; tr. 1873, 36).
In general, in Riemann’s perspective, the properties of space are not given in
advance once and for all, but can be discovered only step by step. Riemann’s
famous urging, in the last sections of his Habilitationsvotrag, to search the ground
of measure relations in the “binding forces” (Riemann, 1854/1868, 149; tr. 1873,
37) that act upon space, could then be interpreted as the geometrical counterpart of
Riemann’s physical speculations about the propagation of all physical phenomena
through infinitely near action in his Fragmente on Naturphilosophie (Riemann,
1876, 532-538; cf. Bottazzini, 1995).
2.2. Riemann between Helmholtz and Christoffel. The Commentatio re-
mained unpublished until 1876, when Dedekind included it in the first edition of
Riemann’s collected works (Riemann, 1876). Dedekind, however, immediately pub-
lished Riemann’s Habilitationsvortrag in 1868 in the Abhandlungen der Königlichen
Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen (Riemann, 1854/1868). Hermann
von Helmholtz had learned of Riemann’s lecture in the same year from Ernst Scher-
ing, who had worked on Gauss’Nachlass together with Riemann and was a close
friend of his: “the few indications you give of the results of the work that Rie-
mann came to exactly the same conclusion as myself,” Helmholtz wrote to Schering
(Koenigsberger, 1906).
Encouraged by the agreement with Riemann’s results, Helmholtz decided to
present his own reflections of geometry to the public in an 1868 semi-technical talk,
Über die Tatsächlichen Grundlagen der Geometrie, which would be published in
the same year (Helmholtz, 1868a; cf. Volkert, 1993; also see Helmholtz, 1869),
Helmholtz famously outlined the program of deriving Riemann’s hypothesis that
metric relations are given by a quadratic differential from Riemann’s last restriction,
the fact that their congruence does not depend on position: when two rigid point
systems can be brought into congruence in a place, then they can be brought into
congruence everywhere independently from the path along which they were led to
each other (Helmholtz, 1868a, 198).
Helmholtz’s published a lengthy mathematical proof a little later in his famous
1868 paper Über die Thatsachen, die der Geometrie zu Grunde liegen (Helmholtz,
1868b), the title of which clearly mimicked the title of Riemann’s lecture. Roughly
Helmholtz showed that translations and rotations of a rigid body—expressed ana-
lytically by m(m− 1)/2 differential equations between m points—necessarily leave
6 COLLISION OF TRADITIONS
a quadratic differential form unchanged: “With this,” Helmholtz concludes, “we
have got to the starting point of Riemann’s investigations” (Helmholtz, 1868b, 218;
tr. 1977, 56). In this way, however, Helmholtz shifted the attention from points
and the paths that join them to bodies and the volumes they fill Torretti, 1983,
238. Riemann’s more general assumption that the length of lines is independent of
position was substituted with the more restricted condition that angles and sides
of bodies are independent of position, a condition that, as is we have mentioned, is
satisfied by a more limited class a geometries.
The appearance of Riemann’s paper, however, struck his contemporaries also
for very different reasons. Dedekind mentioned Riemann’s unpublished Habili-
tationsvortrag to Elwin Bruno Christoffel—his successor at the ETH in Zurich
(Butzer, 1981). In 1869 in the celebrated Crelle’s Journal, (Christoffel, 1869),
Christoffel addressed the problem raised by Riemann, the equivalence of quadratic
differential forms such as F =
∑
ωikϑxiϑxk, in the most general way, without
focusing on the special case of the reducibility to an expression with constant coef-
ficients (Christoffel, 1869, 46-47; cf. Ehlers, 1981). He introduced the three-index
symbols
{
il
r
}
later named after him (Christoffel, 1869, 49; the Christoffel symbols
of the second kind)—which involve the first derivatives of the ωik—and from them
derived the four-index symbol (ghki) (Christoffel, 1869, 54; that corresponds to the
four-index symbol introduced by Riemann and to our Riemann–Christoffel tensor).
Whereas Christoffel resorted to an abstract algebraic approach, the Bonn math-
ematician Rudolf Lipschitz—in the very same issue of Crelle’s journal (Lipschitz,
1869), reached similar results by investigating the dynamics of a mechanical sys-
tem: he found that if the “the quadrilinear form” Ψx vanishes (Lipschitz, 1869, 84),
the differential form dsp = f(dx)1—which enters into the definition of the inertial
motion of particles—can be reduced to constant coefficients (Lipschitz, 1869, 75;
cf. Lützen, 1995, 1999; Tazzioli, 1994).
Whereas Christoffel and Lipschitz remained outside the philosophical debate, in
1870 Helmholtz had already discussed the epistemological implications of his math-
ematical investigations in a lecture given at the University of Heidelberg, Über den
Ursprung und die Bedeutung der geometrischen Axiome (Helmholtz, 1870/1876; a
partial Eng. tr. appeared as Helmholtz, 1870). The paper includes, among others,
the very famous convex mirror thought experiment, a sort of inversion of Beltrami’s
“interpretation” of non-Euclidean space with negative curvature in the interior of
a Euclidean sphere (Beltrami, 1868a,b). Helmholtz shows that even if our rigid
motions would appear distorted in the mirror (Helmholtz, 1870/1876, 44-45), the
imaginary inhabitants of the mirror-world, by performing their measurements with
equally distorted instruments, would not notice any difference. If they were able
to converse with us, Helmholtz claims, “then neither would be able to convince
the other that he had the true, and the other the distorted situation” (Helmholtz,
1870/1876, 45-46; tr. 1977, 20).
The thought experiment presupposes that in each space all parts, “if one disre-
gards their limits, are mutually congruent” (Helmholtz, 1868b, 200-201; tr. 1977,
43). Helmholtz wanted to emphasize that a decision about which set of congruence
1Lipschitz considered a more general case of a differential form of the pth root, whereas Riemann
had only considered the case p = 2
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relations is the “real” one cannot be made “as long as we introduce no mechani-
cal considerations” (Helmholtz, 1870/1876, 45-46; tr. 1977, 20). Referring to the
“investigations carried out by Prof. Lipschitz in Bonn” (Helmholtz, 1870/1876,
41-42, tr. 1977, 17) Helmholtz points out that if the inhabitants of the convex
mirror were right—and we are living in a distorted non-Euclidean world—then we
would be forced to introduce a non-Newtonian mechanics, where free force motions
would still follow straight lines, but where the speed would depend on the position
(Helmholtz, 1870/1876, 47, tr. 1977, 24).
Helmholtz’s argument implies a sophisticated form of empiricism, in which, given
a set of physical laws, the choice of geometry turned out to be non-arbitrary (DiS-
alle, 2006, 83). Its anti-Kantian implications—the possible discrepancy between
the “transcendental” and physical notion of congruence Helmholtz, 1879, Beilage
III—were mitigated by the fact that Helmholtz seems to consider the very existence
of rigid bodies as a necessary condition of geometry (Helmholtz, 1879, Beilage II;
cf. Friedman, 2002b). With isolated exceptions (Clifford, 1876), Riemann’s specu-
lations about variably curved spaces were never taken seriously in the 19th century
(Hawkins, 1980, 2000). It was rather Helmholtz’s approach that shaped the philo-
sophical discussion, not without the resistance of professional philosophers, who—as
Helmholtz confessed to Lipschitz—were often ready to “pronounce upon the most
complex problems of the theory of space in the sure conviction of superior wisdom”
(Helmholtz to Lipschitz, 2.3.1881 Lipschitz, 1986, 131).
3. The Development of the Helmholtzian and Riemannian Traditions
in the 19th Century
3.1. The Helmholtzian Tradition and the Emergence of Lie’s Theory of
Continuous Groups. In 1883, Felix Klein urged his friend, the Norwegian math-
ematician Sophus Lie, to consider Helmholtz’s geometric work (Stubhaug, 2002,
381) in the light of the theory of continuous groups, on which Lie had systemati-
cally started to work in 1870, playing a significant role in the emergence of Klein’s
own 1872 Erlanger Programm (Klein, 1872; cf. Rowe, 1989). In 1886, Lie was
invited to Berlin to the Meetings of the German Natural Sciences: he gave a lec-
ture entitled, Bemerkungen zu v. Helmholtz Arbeit über die Tatsachen, welche der
Geometrie zugrunde liegen (Lie, 1886, 374), in which he pointed out several impre-
cisions in Helmholtz’s demonstration, suggesting that Helmholtz’s approach could
be improved through group theoretical considerations (Stubhaug, 2002, 340).
In 1887, Poincaré—who had early insisted on the importance of the notion of a
group (Poincaré, 1881, 1882, 1885, 1997; see also Lie’s letter to Klein of October
1882, cited and translated in Rowe, 1985, 76)—referred to Lie’s results in his paper
on the foundations of geometry (Poincaré, 1887, 214). At the end of the paper,
Poincaré also touches on the “celebrated Memoire of Riemann,” in which every
geometry is characterized “through the expression of the arc element as a function
of the coordinates” (Poincaré, 1887, 214). However, he discarded it as geometrically
irrelevant, because it allows for spaces which exclude “the existence of a group of
motion which does not alter distances” (Poincaré, 1887, 214).
Lie did further work on Helmholtz’s space problem, in some papers published
in the early 1890s (see Lie, 1890a,b, 1892a,b). In a series of lectures he had given
in Göttingen on non-Euclidean geometry (1889–90) (published as Klein, 1893),
Klein failed to refer explicitly to Lie’s result, arousing his angry reaction: “You
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still challenge me to destroy the Helmholtz’s theory. I shall eventually do so. I
also show . . . that H[elmholtz]’s theory is basically false” (cited and translated in
Rowe, 1988, 39).
In his 1893 lecture given in Chicago on the occasion of the World’s Fair, Klein ad-
mitted that Lie’s 1886 paper on Helmholtz “somehow escaped my memory” (Klein,
1894, Lecutre XL, 88). “These papers,” Klein observed, “contain an application of
Lie’s theory of continuous groups to the problem formulated by Helmholtz” (Klein,
1894, Lecutre XL, 88). The motions of three-dimensional space with respect to a
certain point can take ∞6 of possible real values (a rigid body has six degrees of
freedom) and form a group (two motions can be always replaced by a single one),
that leaves invariant the distance between any two points p, p′ given by Ω(p, p′).
Lie famously showed that, considering only a part of space surrounding the origin,
if a 12n(n+ 1)-parameter group (in an n-dimensional number manifold) can be de-
fined, then the space is of maximal uniformity, that is, of constant or null curvature
(on Lie’s result see Klein, 1898).
This local result of Lie (which stands in sharp contrast with Klein’s concern
with the global Clifford–Klein problem; cf. Hawkins, 2000, 134) appeared in its
definitive form in the last volume of his masterpiece, written with Friedrich Engel,
Theorie der Transformationsgruppen (Lie, 1893, ch. 21). According to what Lie
and Engel write in a footnote, Poincaré was not aware of Helmholtz’s work in
1887 (Lie, 1893, 437, footnote). It is not clear when precisely Poincaré come to
know Helmholtz’s epistemological reflections (Heinzmann, 2001), but his name is
mentioned in Poincaré’s 1891 philosophical paper which is usually considered as
the birth of geometric conventionalism (Poincaré, 1891, 774).
A year later (Poincaré, 1892), responding to the objections of George Mouret,
Poincaré transformed Helmholtz’s convex mirror thought experiment in his famous
“parable” (Sklar, 1974, 91-93 and 113-115) of the heated sphere (cf. also Poincaré,
1895, 641–644), in which a non-Euclidean space is mimicked by a suitable temper-
ature field, which uniformly distorts the motion of solids and the paths of light
rays. The inhabitants of such a world might, however, decide to introduce a non-
Maxwellian law of light propagation, in order keep the simpler Euclidean geometry
(Walter, 2009). Thus the latter can always be “saved” if one, contrary to Helmholtz,
is ready to change the “laws of physics.”
In Poincaré’s approach, also, a choice must be made between alternative, but
unique sets of congruence relations (unique up to the choice of a unit of length): ho-
mogenous tessellations of space, each defined by the properties of the corresponding
group of rigid motions. It is not by chance that Poincaré again explicitly excluded
Riemann’s approach based “on the manner in which the length of a curve is de-
fined” (Poincaré, 1891, 773), being incompatible” with the “movement of a solid
body” such as “we assume to be possible in Lie’s theorem” (Poincaré, 1891, 773;
47). According to Poincaré, the geometries of Riemann, in the general case, “can be
nothing but purely analytical, and would not lend themselves to proofs analogous
to those of Euclid.” (Poincaré, 1891, 773; 47)
3.2. The Analytical Development of the Riemannian Tradition: Ricci and
the Absolute Differential Calculus. Roughly in the same years, Riemann’s
work had been in fact developed along the non-geometrical path put forward by
Christoffel. In 1892, Gregorio Ricci-Curbastro had published in Darboux’s Bulletin
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a first summary (Ricci-Curbastro, 1892) of nearly a decade of work on the equiv-
alence of quadratic differential forms (Ricci-Curbastro, 1884, 1886, 1888, 1889).
Ricci was able to systematize Christoffel’s results into his “absolute differential cal-
culus,” (Bottazzini, 1999) as Ricci started to call it in 1893, alluding to the fact
that it can be applied “independently of the choice of the independent variables”
(Ricci-Curbastro, 1893, 1336, n.1).
Ricci’s main interest was in the study of quadratic differential forms, such as
“ϕ =
∑
rs
arsdxrdxs,” where the ars can be the conductivity coefficients in the
analytical theory of heat, or the components of pressure in elasticity theory (Ricci-
Curbastro, 1892, 167-168). Roughly, the problem was then to establish the laws
according to which the coefficients ars change, by replacing the independent vari-
ables x1 x2, . . . xn with the variables y1 y2, . . . yn (which are smooth functions
of the first ones) in such a way as to leave ϕ invariant. Ricci’s main innovation
was to interpret the three index-symbol ars,i and the four index-symbol art,su
(Ricci-Curbastro, 1892, 173) introduced by Christoffel as the result of a kind of
differentiation more general than the usual one, that he referred to as “covariant
differentiation.” The case in which “√ϕ is the expression of the line element of the
space of three dimensions in curvilinear coordinates x1, x2, x3” (Ricci-Curbastro,
1892, 167-168) is of course only a particular application of Ricci’s mathematical
apparatus.
In Padua, in 1899, Klein met Ricci’s pupil Tullio Levi-Civita and asked him
to publish, in the Mathematische Annalen, an organic and systematic account of
Ricci’s results (Levi-Civita to Arnold Sommerfeld 30.3.1899, Sommerfeld, 2000-
2004, vol.1, 105). In 1900, Levi-Civita co-authored with Ricci the memoir “Méth-
odes de calcul différentiel absolu et leurs applications” in 1900 (Levi-Civita and
Ricci-Curbastro, 1900), which was destined to become the manifesto of the abso-
lute differential calculus. Ricci’s results however, were initially dismissed as “useful
but not indispensable” (Bianchi, 1902, 149), and remained substantially unnoticed
(Reich, 1994, 77, but see Bottazzini, 1999). As is well known, it has been general
relativity that showed the indispensability of Ricci’s work and stimulated Levi-
Civita’s geometrical reinterpretation (see below §4.3). As we shall see, it is only
from inside this tradition, which spread from Riemann to Levi-Civita, that the sig-
nificance of general relativity for the history of the epistemology of geometry should
be understood.
4. Einstein’s Relativity Theories: Between the Helmholtzian and
Riemannian Traditions
4.1. Escaping from the Helmholtzian Tradition. Rigid Bodies and Special
Relativity. Hermann Minkowski’s (Minkowski, 1909) presentation of the Einstein–
Lorentz electrodynamics of a moving body (Einstein, 1905) in terms of the group
Gc (that leaves the quadratic differential expression c2t2−dx2−dx2−dz2 invariant)
might be considered the first triumph of the group theoretical approach to physics
(Walter, 1999)—a fact about which Minkowski’s Göttingen colleague Klein was of
course very pleased (Klein, 1910). It is however less appreciated in the philosoph-
ical literature that already special relativity unwittingly marked the beginning of
the end of the Helmholtzian approach to the epistemology of geometry, via the
discussion of the relativistic definition of rigid motion.
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It was another Göttingen scientist, Max Born, who was the first to face the
analytical problem of “defining rigidity by a differential law instead of an inte-
gral law” (Born, 1909, 3), by using a quadratic form of three spatial differentials
dξ, dη, dγ, (ds2 = p11dξ2 + p22dη2 + p33dζ2 + 2p12dξ dη + 2p13dξ dζ + 2p23dη dζ)
in which the coefficients pαβ are the “deformation quantities” (Born, 1909, 10). A
motion of a filament in space–time will be rigid if ∂pαβτ = 0 (where τ is the proper
time. Born then carried out the integration of these conditions for bodies for the
case of a uniformly accelerated translation (Born, 1909, 15). Soon thereafter Paul
Ehrenfest (Ehrenfest, 1909) pointed out that, assuming Born’s relativistic defini-
tion of rigidity, it turns out that a rigid cylinder cannot rotate without violating
Lorentz invariance (the Ehrenfest paradox). Gustav Herglotz (Herglotz, 1910) and
Fritz Noether (Noether, 1910), Emmy Noether’s brother) showed that Born’s in-
finitesimal condition of rigidity implies that a rigid body has only three degrees of
freedom.
Einstein had rapidly come to recognize that, according to the “investigations of
Born and Herglotz,” “in the theory of relativity there does not exist a ‘rigid’ body
with six degrees of freedom” (an Jakob Laub, March 1910; CPAE, 5, Doc. 199,
232; cited and tr. in Stachel, 1989, 268). It was finally Max von Laue who, in 1911
(Laue, 1911), showed that actually special relativity does not allow at all for the
usual concept of a rigid body: in a relativistic rigid body, “the number of kinematic
degrees of freedom is infinitely great” (Laue, 1911, 86).
After all, the very notion of a rigid body also intuitively contradicted the special
relativistic ban on superluminal signaling (Laue, 1911, 86): the motion of a part of
a rigid body would instantaneously “signal” to all other parts of the body that they
had to move, too. It was, however, not easy to avoid resorting to “rigid bodies”
in a context where a coordinate system was still thought of as a rigid cubical
lattice of meter sticks (and an array of clocks) that fill space–time. By discussing
his celebrated “rigidly rotating disk” thought experiment (Stachel, 1989), Einstein
seemed then to be ready to embrace the patent inconsistency that, “even though
the rigid body cannot really exist,” nevertheless “[t]he measuring rods as well as
the coordinate axes are to be considered as rigid bodies” (Einstein, 1912, 131).
4.2. Entering into the Riemannian Tradition: Rods and Clocks and Gen-
eral Relativity. Einstein’s rigidly rotating disc has been described as the “missing
link” (Stachel, 1989) in the path that led to Einstein’s “decisive idea” (Einstein,
1923b) to resort to Gauss’s theory of surfaces; but also Born’s work may have sug-
gested to him that he consider quadratic differential forms with variable coefficients
(Maltese and Orlando, 1995). Einstein was not “aware at that time of the work of
Riemann, Ricci, and Levi-Civita” (Einstein, 1923b), to which Grossman famously
introduced him in August 1912, starting the long journey that would lead to general
relativity (similar statements can be found in Einstein’s 1922 Kyoto address Abiko,
2000).
In a 1913 joint paper (Einstein and Grossmann, 1913), Einstein and Grossman fa-
mously outlined a theory of gravitation based the so called Entwurf -theory. In a pa-
per published briefly thereafter (Grossmann, 1913), Grossman summarizes their col-
laboration as follows: “The mathematical core [Grundgedanke] of Einstein’s theory
of gravitation” consists in the idea “of characterising a gravitational field through a
quadratic differential form with variable coefficients”, ds2 =
∑
gµνdxµdxν , whose
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coefficients gµν represent both the behavior of measuring rods and clocks with refer-
ence to the coordinate system, as well as the potentials of the gravitational field. “Of
fundamental importance [Von grundlegender Bedeutung] in this respect [hierbei],”
Grossman continues, “are the famous paper of Christoffel, Über die Transformation
ganzer homogener Differentialausdrücke [Christoffel, 1869], and the paper, based
on the latter, of Ricci und Levi-Civita, Méthodes de calcul différentiel absolu et
leurs applications [Levi-Civita and Ricci-Curbastro, 1900]. In the latter work the
authors developed the method for giving to differential equations of mathematical
physics a form which is independent of the coordinate system” (Grossmann, 1913,
291).
Einstein’s articles and research notes up to 1915 document how the search for
the coordinate-independent partial differential field equations (cf. Renn, 2007, for
a recent overall account) to determine the gµν had to overcome—besides “techni-
cal” problems related to finding a suitable two-index contraction of the Riemann-
Christoffel tensor—also some “philosophical” difficulties that concerned primarily
the physical significance of the coordinate system.
Einstein had to explain how to verify the values gµν predicted by the field equa-
tions through measurements with rods and clocks in a context in which the length
of a measuring rod and the rate of a clock is not determined solely by the coordi-
nate differentials but also by the quantities gµν (Einstein and Grossmann, 1913),
that is, by the very quantities that should be measured. Einstein started to dis-
tinguish between “coordinate distances” (Koordinatenabstände) and “natural dis-
tances” (natürliche Abstände), as measured by rods and clocks (cf. Einstein, 1913,
490).
In a small enough (in astronomical proportions) region of space–time, where the
gµν may be considered constant (i.e., taking on the Minkowski values) to a suffi-
ciently accurate approximation, the coordinate differentials dXν can be measured
directly by rods and clocks; ds, oriented in any way, can be calculated as the root
of the sum of squares of the co-ordinate differentials. In a finite region, however,
there is, in general, no choice of co-ordinates for which special relativity is valid:
the distance ds is not determined solely by the sum of the coordinate differentials
dxν of its end points, but the functions gµν must also be introduced if the mea-
surements made by the rods and clocks are to yield the same invariant interval ds
in every position and in every orientation.
It is in particular in the last sections of Einstein’s systematic exposition of the
Entwurf -theory, presented to the Berlin Academy, Die formale Grundlage der all-
gemeinen Relativitätstheorie (Einstein, 1914), that Einstein explicitly addressed the
implications that the new theory can have for the “epistemology of geometry”:
Before Maxwell, the laws of nature were, in spatial relation, in principle
integral laws: this is to say that distances between points finitely sep-
arated from one another appeared in the elementary laws. . . . From
this viewpoint, the propositions of geometry are to be considered as in-
tegral physical laws, since they deal with distances of finitely separated
points. Through and since Maxwell, physics has undergone a through-
going radical change in gradually carrying through the demand that dis-
tances of finitely separated points may no longer appear in the elemen-
tary laws, that is, “action at a distance theories” [Fernwirkungs-Theorien]
are replaced by “local-action theories” [Nahewirkungs-Theorien]. In this
process it was forgotten that also Euclidean geometry—as employed in
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physics—consists of physical propositions that from a physical viewpoint
are to be set precisely on the side of the integral laws of the Newtonian
point mechanics. In my opinion, this signifies an inconsistency from
which we should free ourselves (Einstein, 1914, 1079-1080; tr. Ryckman,
2005, 63).
This passage might be considered the coup de grace for the “Helmholtzian tradi-
tion” in the epistemology of geometry. Helmholtz’s approach is, by its very nature,
a “distant geometrical” point of view, in which finite fixed distances are regarded
as freely movable in space. General relativity, appropriating the mathematical ap-
paratus that had emerged from the “Riemannian tradition,” had fully implemented
a near-geometrical point of view, by banning finite point-distances from the laws
of nature, in which now only the distances ds of infinitely near points may occur.
In pre-general-relativistic theories, a coordinate system was thought of as a scaf-
fold of congruent tiles made of rigid rods (and clocks) defined independently of the
physical fields spread on it. In general relativity, the functions gµν that enter into
the definition of ds themselves represent the potentials of a physical field, subject to
partial differential equations and which contain at the same time all the information
about the coordinate system. Only after having definitively renounced—via the so
called “hole argument” (Norton, 1984; Stachel, 1980)—the independent physical
role of a coordinate system was Einstein able to present his field equations in No-
vember 1915: “a real triumph,” as Einstein put it, of the mathematical formalism
developed through the work of Riemann, Christoffel, Ricci, and Levi-Civita (Ein-
stein, 1915, 778).
It is worth noticing that such a formalism has only a tenuous connection to
geometry. In particular, Einstein—even in his first systematic presentation (in
1916) of his newly completed general theory (Einstein, 1916)—does not refer to
the “curvature of space–time.” The Riemann–Christoffel tensor is introduced only
as a merely analytical tool (Janssen, 1992; Reich, 1994, 204-5), in as much as it
is the only tensor “which can be obtained from the fundamental tensor gµν by
differentiation alone” (Einstein, 1916).
A “geometrical” issue emerges only when it comes to comparing the values of
the gµν predicted by the field equations, (e.g. a spherically symmetric asymptoti-
cally flat solution Einstein, 1916, §22) with the values obtained by measurement.
Roughly, the gµν can be found empirically as the factors by which the coordinate
differentials dxν must be multiplied in order to ensure that ds2 has the same value
(normed as the unit interval) measured locally, in a flat region of space-time (Ein-
stein, 1916, §4), in every position and in every orientation. In the case considered
by Einstein (Einstein, 1916, §22), for a unit measuring rod put radially to the
spherical field (ds2 = −1; dx2 = dx3 = dx4 = 0), we have −1 = g11dx 21 , whereas a
tangential position (dx1 = dx3 = dx4 = 0) it would measure −1 = g22dx 22 = −dx 22 .
In the presence of a real gravitational field—if “the same rod independent of its
position and its orientation can serve as the measure of the same extension” (Ein-
stein, 1916, 820)—it is impossible to chose a coordinate system so that coordinate
distances always correspond to real distances as in Euclidean geometry. Similarly,
if one assumes that a unit clock at rest (dx1 = dx2 = dx3 = 0) always measures the
same ds = 1, the only non-vanishing coordinate differential dx4 has to be multiplied
by the correcting factor g44 (1 = g44dx 24 ) (Einstein, 1916, 820).
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Concretely, to directly measure the numerical value of the ds, we might use a
small enough rigid rod, for instance, a rock salt crystal, and a fast enough uniformly-
running clock, such as a cadmium atom emitting its red line. General relativity
assumes that “the ratio between the wave length of the red cadmium line and
the lattice constant of rock salt is an absolute constant” (Flamm, 1916, 451; my
emphasis), which is not affected by the presence of the gravitational field. This is
nothing else than the “operational” reformulation of the Riemannian postulate that
the length of a line must be independent of its position. Once an atom has been
chosen as unit clock, proper time s is calculated as the integral of the infinitesimal
element ds along a time-like path.
Of course this lets emerge a difficulty of which Einstein became immediately con-
scious. The reproducibility of such complicated atomic structures in determinate
circumstances—for instance in a strong electromagnetic field—is far from being ob-
vious. However, the very possibility of making measurements in general relativity
presupposes the constancy of the relative lengths of rods and the relative periods of
clocks whatever gravitational or electromagnetic fields they have passed through.
Einstein made this presupposition explicit as early as in a letter to Michele Besso
in late 1916: “your observation about the equivalence of phyic[cally] different mea-
suring rods and clocks (and subjected to different prehistories),” Einstein writes,
“is fully correct” (CPAE 8, Doc. 270, 349; Einstein, 1972, 86). This is, so to
say, the fact at the basis of the Riemann–Einstein geometry of space–time. The
investigation of the epistemological status of this presupposition is precisely the
fundamental problem around which the discussions on the role of rods and clocks
in general relativity revolved.
4.3. Beyond Riemann. Levi-Civita, Weyl, and the Geometrical Devel-
opment of the Riemannian Tradition. In 1917—at the request of the editor
of the Naturwissenschaften —Moritz Schlick wrote a semi-popular two–part paper
on relativity, destined to become a classic (Schlick, 1917). Relying on Einstein’s
insistence that the quantitative comparison of lengths and times is possible only
by means “measuring-rods and clocks” (Schlick, 1917, 163, tr. 1920, 13), Schlick
could effectively present general relativity to a philosophical audience as the heir
of the well known discussion between Helmholtz and Poincaré on the role of rigid
bodies in the epistemology of geometry. Of course Schlick was well aware that the
notion of a rigid body was already modified by special relativity (Schlick, 1917, 182,
tr. 1920, 55) and that it is completely meaningless in general relativity (Schlick,
1917, 183, tr. 1920, 55). However, Schlick could believe that the role which “rigid
bodies” had played in the Helmholtz–Poincaré debate was simply taken up by the
infinitesimal rigid rods (and clocks with infinitesimal periods) in Einstein’s theory.
Although Einstein was enthusiastic about Schlick’s paper (CPAE 8, Doc. 297; cf.
Howard, 1984), the role of rods and clocks in general relativity is hardly understand-
able in the context of Helmholtz’s philosophy of geometry and its conventionalist
incarnation in Poincaré’s work. The choice of a certain rod as a unit rod is of
course arbitrary, but this is irrelevant: it only corresponds to the choice of the
unit of measure in which we agree to express the lengths of lines. On the other
hand, the fact that “two of our little rods can still be brought into coincidence [zur
Deckung] at every position” in space (Einstein, 1917, 57; tr. 2005, 108), despite
the different physical circumstances they have passed through, is not a matter of
convention: it represents a central feature of the Riemann–Einstein geometry. It
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is only when Einstein’s theory forced the mathematical community to let the ge-
ometrical content of the Riemannian tradition re-emerge after decades of abstract
algebraic development that the problematic nature of Einstein’s assumption could
fully emerge.
In 1916/1917, Levi-Civita (Levi-Civita, 1916, but see also Hessenberg, 1917/18
and Schouten, 1918–1919), had famously recognized the geometric meaning of the
Christoffel symbols and of the covariant differentiation: they determine the parallel
displacement of vectors (Reich, 1992). As Hermann Weyl systematically showed in
his 1917 lectures on relativity at the ETH Zurich (Weyl, 1918b, §15f.), the Ricci
calculus can be translated into more intuitive geometrical terms (Reich, 1992).
Roughly, the line element ds can be seen as a vector the components of which
are the coordinate differentials dxν relative to the chosen coordinate system. In
a Euclidean region of space (where there exists a coordinate system in which the
gik are constant), when a vector is parallel-transported around a loop it always
returns to its original position with the same length and direction: the Christoffel
symbols
{
rs
i
}
= Γirs (Weyl, 1918b, 99)—the components of the “affine connection,”
in the terminology that Weyl will soon adopt (Weyl, 1919b, 101)—can be made
vanish identically. However, this property does not hold in the general case: the
Riemann–Christoffel tensor Rijhk measures precisely the change in the direction
resulting from parallel transport around the loop (Weyl, 1918b, §16; cf. Scholz,
1994, §4). Einstein, was extremely impressed by Weyl’s geometrical derivation of
the curvature tensor (cf. the letter to Weyl of 8.3.1918, CPAE, Doc 476, 670),
which he praised in a enthusiastic review of Weyl’s book (Einstein, 1918b).
Weyl also announced to Einstein (CPAE 8, Doc. 270) the draft of a 10 page paper
(published after some difficulties as Weyl, 1918a), in which the disturbing asymme-
try between length and direction in Levi-Civita’s parallel transport (Afriat, 2009)
could be dropped, in the name of a purely infinitesimal geometry (Weyl, 1918c). In
this kind of geometry the determination of magnitudes does not take place directly
at a distance: transporting a unit vector along a closed path, one might arrive
at the end of the journey around a loop with a different transported measuring
unit, depending on the path. Weyl introduced later the “length-curvature” tensor
fik (Streckenkrümmung) as the measure of such a change of length, just like the
Riemann “vector-curvature” tensor (Vektorkrümmung) measures the change of di-
rection. Riemannian geometry is only a special case of a Weylean geometry where
the fik = 0 (Weyl, 1919a, 109).
As is well known, Weyl suggested that, by dropping the last distant-geometric
feature of Riemannian geometry, namely, the independence of the ratio of the
measure-units from their position, a possible unification of “gravitation and elec-
tricity” might be achieved: when separated and brought together, rods and clocks
would have different relative lengths and periods if they have passed through
electromagnetic fields. Roughly, the gravitational field reveals itself in the non-
integrability or path-dependency of direction, but the electromagnetic field reveals
itself in the non-integrability of length (cf. e.g. Scholz, 1994, §5).
Against Weyl’s “stroke of genius” (CPAE 8, Doc. 498, 710), Einstein raised a
famous “measuring-rod objection” (CPAE 8, Doc. 498, 710; CPAE 8, Doc. 515),
published as an addendum to Weyl’s paper (Einstein, 1918a). If Weyl’s theory were
true, Einstein claimed, “the relative frequency of two neighboring atoms of the same
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kind would be different in general” (Einstein, 1918a, 40; tr. in O’Raifeartaigh, 1997,
35). Such behavior would contradict the empirical fact that energized atoms emit
sharp, separated lines independently of their prehistory. Replying to Einstein, Weyl
insisted that it is epistemologically unsatisfying to resort to the behavior of com-
plicated atomic structures to measure the invariant ds. In fact, one can learn how
a clock behaves, e.g., in a strong electromagnetic field, only from “a dynamical the-
ory based on physical laws” (Weyl, 1918c, 479). Weyl did not intend to deny the
physical behavior of atomic structure pointed out by Einstein, but to urge a dynam-
ical explanation for the existence of such a “central office of standards” [Eichamt]
(Weyl, 1919a, 103), for the fact that in Riemannian geometry “the measuring unit
(the cm) can be chosen once and and all (of course the same in every position)”
(Weyl, 1919b, 110).
Since Weyl could not rely on any dynamical models at that time, at the Meet-
ing of Natural Scientists in Bad Nauheim in September 1920, he famously started
to speculate that atoms might not really preserve their radius if transported, but
adjust it every time anew to the space–time structure, in particular to the radius
of curvature of Einstein’s static spherical universe (Weyl, 1920, 650). The apparent
Riemannian behavior of rods and clocks is then enforced by the physical mecha-
nism of adjustment, making the “real” non-Riemannian geometry of space–time in
principle unobservable.
In the discussion which followed Weyl’s paper, Einstein complained that, if the
“equality” of rods an clocks “would dependent on their prehistory,” one would lose
“the possibility of coordinating [zuzuordnen] a number, ds, to two neighboring
points” (Einstein’s reply to Weyl, 1920, 650). Renouncing such “empirically based
coordination,” the theory would be deprived of its empirical content. Einstein could,
however not avoid acknowledging that it is a shortcoming of general relativity: it
would be preferable if measuring rods are “introduced separately,” but “constructed
as solutions of differential equations” (Laue, 1920, 650).
The importance of this epistemological ideal and the impossibility of fulfilling it
at the present stage of development of physics (cf. Fogel, 2008, ch. 3, 4) emerges
in several parts of Einstein’s correspondence with Weyl himself (CPAE 8, Docc.
472, 507, 512, 551, 661), with Walter Dällenbach (CPAE 8, Docc. 299, 863), Besso
(CPAE 8, Doc. 604), Adriaan Fokker (CPAE 9, Doc. 76), and others (Goenner,
2004). It reveals Einstein’s ambiguity between the provisional acceptance of rods
as and clocks as metrical indicators (Howard, 1990, 1994) and his commitment to
the higher epistemological standard on which Weyl had insisted (Ryckman, 2005,
§1.4).
For our purposes, it is important to emphasize that this discussion about the
role of rods and clocks in general relativity has of course nothing to do with the
“Helmholtzian” consideration about the role of rigid bodies in the foundation of
geometry, as Schlick thought: it pertains exclusively to the status of the “Rie-
mannian” requirement that the lines, one-dimensional measuring threads, should
be independent of their position (Weyl, 1919a, 102). The Helmholtzian standpoint
presupposes that space is, as Weyl pictorially put it, a uniform “tenement house
[Mietkaserne]” (Weyl’s commentary in Riemann, 1919, 45, n. 6): it is a rigid scaf-
fold of congruent tiles, which is independent of any physical process, and serves as
a form for the phaenomena, a conception that general relativity made untenable.
The Riemannian standpoint assumes on the contrary only the existence of a central
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“office of standards [Eichamt]” (Weyl, 1919a, 103), i.e., the global availability of
the unit of measure.
The “conventionalist” agenda that Schlick by that time had treated system-
atically in his epistemological monograph (Schlick, 1918) confused two problems
emerging from two traditions, the one that draws on Helmholtz and the other that
goes back to Riemann, which must however be carefully distinguished. This can
be seen by the high level of mathematical sophistication (Scholz, 2004) necessary
to bring them together, a task that Weyl himself had started to work on in those
years (Weyl, 1922, 1923, 1925/1988) in the attempt to single out group theoret-
ically the Riemannian “class of Pythagorean metrics” from all possible classes of
“Finsler metrics” (Finsler, 1918), as the one endowed with a a uniquely determined
affine connection (Scholz, 2004), an attempt that, due to its philosophical inspi-
ration (Ryckman, 2005, §6.3.2), remained mostly on the brink of a philosophical
discussion (but see, e.g., Becker, 1923).
5. The Emergence of Logical Empiricism as a Progressive Blurring
of the Helmholtzian and the Riemannian Traditions
Thus, the Einstein–Weyl debate had raised a central epistemological problem. As
Arthur S. Eddington—the “apostle” of relativity to the English-speaking world—
explains in the second edition (Eddington, 1920a) of his report on relativity (Ed-
dington, 1918): “In Einstein’s theory it is assumed that the interval ds has an
absolute value, so that two intervals at different points of the world can be imme-
diately compared” (Eddington, 1920a, X). Operationally this means that “atoms
which are absolutely similar will measure by their vibrations equal values of the
absolute interval ds” (Eddington, 1920a), that can be normed as the unit interval.
The hypothesis that there are no systematic differences in the previous histories
of different atoms of the same substance, even if they have passed through strong
gravitational or electromagnetic fields, ensures that this norm can be replicated
everywhere. It is however an assumption that depends on quantum theoretical
considerations about the structure of matter, and thus which lie totally outside
the macroscopic setting of general relativity: “The general course is to start with
the ‘interval’ as something immediately measurable with scales and clocks,” but,
as Eddington points out, “in a strict analytical development the introduction of
scales and clocks before the introduction of matter is—to say the least of it—an
inconvenient proceeding” (Eddington, 1920b, 152).
5.1. The Early Reichenbach’s anti-Conventionalist Stance. Schlick was then
right to emphasize the crucial epistemological role played by rods and clocks in gen-
eral relativity as the only means to coordinate the abstract mathematical apparatus
of the theory with concrete physical reality. However, this role clearly cannot be
understood within the framework set by the Helmholtz–Poincaré debate on the role
of rigid bodies in the foundations of geometry. It is the Riemann–Weyl opposition
that, historically and systematically, should be regarded as the correct setting in
which to understand Einstein’s own wavering attitude toward rods and clocks as
guarantors of the physical content of his theory of gravitation.
The incompatibility of Einstein’s new theory with 19th century conventionalism
was simply, but masterfully, explained in the brief monograph on relativity, Rela-
tivitätstheorie und Erkenntnis apriori (Reichenbach, 1920b), that the young Hans
Reichenbach—who had just participated in Einstein’s 1919 summer term lectures
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on general relativity in Berlin2—had finished writing in June 1920 (cf. CPAE 9,
Doc. 57, June 1920):
It was from a mathematical standpoint asserted that geometry has only
to do with conventional stipulations with an empty schema containing no
statements about reality but rather chosen only as the form of the latter,
and which can with equal justification be replaced by a non-Euclidean
schema.* Against these objections, however, the claim of the general
theory of relativity presents a completely new idea. This theory makes
the equally simple and clear assertion that the propositions of Euclidean
geometry are just false
* Poincaré has defended this conception [Poincaré, 1902]. It is char-
acteristic that from the outset he excludes Riemannian geometry for his
proof of equivalence, because it does not permit the shifting of a body with-
out a change of form. If he had known that it would be this geometry
which physics would choose, he would not have been able to assert the
arbitrariness of geometry (Reichenbach, 1920b, 104, n. 1; tr. 1965, 109,
n. 1; translation modified; my emphasis).
In this well known passage, Reichenbach shows that conventionalism presupposes
the validity of the Helmholtzian requirement that that the congruence of bodies is
independent of position, it presupposes the existence of incompatible, but unique
sets of congruence-relations, among which, once and for all, a choice can be made.
For this reason, as we have seen, Poincaré had explicitly connected his convention-
alism to the work of Lie. The notion of congruence naturally relates the concept of
tessellation with the properties of a group of rigid motions mapping the space onto
itself.
In Einstein–Riemann geometry, on the contrary, measurement is assured by the
possibility of comparing small measuring rods. In the failure to extend the local
Euclidean behavior of such rods over larger regions of space, Reichenbach points out,
“the invalidity of Euclidean geometry is considered proven” (Reichenbach, 1921a,
383, tr. 2006, 42; my emphasis) at least if we attribute the length 1 to the rod in all
positions and in every orientation. As Reichenbach rightly notices, this impossibility
makes manifest “the absolute character of the curvature of space” expressed by the
Riemann–Christoffel tensor. (Reichenbach, 1920b, 31, tr. 1965, 33; my emphasis)
Reichenbach has thus separated what Schlick had irremediably confused: the
Helmholtzian measuring procedure based on the free mobility of finite bodies and
the Riemannian one on the transportability of small one-dimensional rods. As
Reichenbach knows perfectly well, however, this latter assumption is far from
being obvious: “Weyl’s generalization of the theory of relativity,” Reichenbach
writes, “abandons altogether the concept of a definite length for an infinitely small
measuring-rod” (Reichenbach, 1920b, 73, tr. 1965, 76), so that “the comparison of
two small measuring rods at two different space points would also no longer contain
the objective relation that it contains in Einstein’s theory” (Reichenbach, 1920b,
87, tr. 1965, 91; translation modified)
Reichenbach is aware that this point can be easily understood by resorting to
Levi-Civita’s notion of the parallel transport of vectors. This is not surprising
since in the lectures on relativity that Reichenbach had followed in Berlin, Einstein
2The Hans Reichenbach Collection at the University of Pittsburgh HR 028-01-04 and 028-01-
03
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had used for the first time the concept of parallel displacement in introducing the
Riemann tensor (CPAE 7, p. 11, note 179). Reichenbach summarizes:
Weyl’s theory represents a possible generalization of Einstein’s concep-
tion of space which, although not yet confirmed empirically, is by no
means impossible . . . In Euclidean geometry a vector can be shifted par-
allel to itself along a closed curve so that upon its return to the point
of departure it has the same direction and the same length. In the
Einstein–Riemannian geometry it has merely the same length, no longer
the original direction, after its return. In Weyl’s theory it does not even
retain the same length. This generalization can be continued. If the
closed curve is reduced to an infinitely small circle, the changes disap-
pear. The next step in the generalization would be to assume that the
vector changes its length upon turning around itself. There is no “most
general” geometry (Reichenbach, 1920b, 76, tr. 1965, 79; my emphasis)
Put in these terms, it appears clear that the transportability of infinitesimal rigid
rods is the distinctive feature of the entire class of Riemannian geometries if con-
sidered as a special case of a more encompassing class (such as that of Weyl ge-
ometries). It has therefore nothing to do with the problem of the choice between
Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry (which is between special cases of Riemann-
ian metrics) as in classical conventionalism.
As we have seen, general relativity assumes the Riemannian behavior of clocks,
the relative periods of which is the always the same whenever they are brought
together; Weyl suggested that “the frequency of a clock,” might be “dependent
upon its previous history” (Reichenbach, 1920b, 77, tr. 1965, 79)
The fact that this is contradicted by our knowledge of the behavior of clocks
does not necessarily contradict Weyl’s theory, since it could be assumed that the
influences suffered by the clocks “compensate each other on the average”; hence “the
experiences made until now, according to which, say, the frequency of a spectral
line under otherwise equal conditions is the same on all celestial bodies, can be
interpreted as approximations” (Reichenbach, 1920b, 77, tr. 1965, 79) Thus the
real geometry of the world might be Weyl’s geometry, in spite of the empirically
observed Riemannian behavior of rods and clocks.
Reichenbach was however skeptical about Weyl’s presumption to deduce the real
geometry of space from an epistemological principle, the principle of the relativity
of magnitude: “Weyl’s generalization must be investigated from the viewpoint of a
physical theory, and only experience can be used for a critical analysis” (Reichen-
bach, 1920b, 73, tr. 1965, 77) especially if one consider that Weyl’s geometry is
not even the only possible non-Riemannian geometry that one can possibly take
into consideration. Reichenbach sent his book to Weyl who responded privately
(Rynasiewicz, 2005) and publicly by arguing that his theory did not make any pre-
tense to deduce the non-integrability of lengths by pure reason, but only show that
“it must be understood as the outflow [Ausfluß] of a law of nature” (Weyl, 1921c,
475; emphasis mine). As we have seen, it is precisely this alternative that plays a
central role in Einstein’s epistemological reflections about geometry.
5.2. Einstein’s Misleading Reference to Poincaré in Geometrie und Er-
fahrung. It has puzzled historians that Reichenbach was ready to give up his
convincing analysis of the role of rods and clocks in general relativity and embrace
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conventionalism after having exchanged a few letters with Schlick (Schlick and Re-
ichenbach, 1920–1922). In the absence of additional information, one can only
speculate that the publication of Einstein’s celebrated Geometrie und Erfahrung
(Einstein, 1921, the expanded version of a lecture given on 27 January 1921) might
have played a relevant role in convincing Reichenbach of the correctness of Schlick’s
epistemological stance.
In his celebrated lecture, Einstein, after having introduced, with a reference to
Schlick’s “book on epistemology [Schlick 1918]” (Einstein, 1921, 5; tr. 1954, 235)
a rigid distinction between “axiomatic geometry” and “practical geometry,” claims
in fact that without a sort of “Helmholtzian” (see below on p. 24) approach to
geometry as a natural science concerning the physical behavior of practically-rigid
bodies, he “should have been unable to formulate the theory of relativity” (Einstein,
1921, 6-7; tr. 1954, 235) . On the other hand, however, Einstein recognized that
Poincaré was in principle, sub specie aeterni, right by claiming that it is always
possible to make rigid bodies agree with any kind of geometry by changing the
physical laws that govern their behavior Einstein, 1921, 8; tr. 1954, 236). Only the
sum geometry plus physics, G+P as Einstein famously concludes, can be compared
with experience Einstein, 1921, 7s. tr. 1954, 236; cf. Friedman, 2002a).
However, on closer inspection the reference to Poincaré in Einstein’s Geometrie
und Erfahrung is highly misleading (Friedman, 2002a). The problem Einstein was
addressing had clearly nothing to do with the Helmholtz–Poincaré alternative be-
tween the empirical or conventional choice between Euclidean and non-Euclidean
sorts of Riemannian geometries. Even if the name of Weyl is not mentioned, Ein-
stein was concerned with a feature of Riemannian geometries as such, precisely that
feature of which Weyl’s work had revealed the contingency (Ryckman, 2005, §4.5).
As we have seen, measurement in general relativity presupposes that if two rods
that “are found to be equal once and anywhere, they are equal always and every-
where” (Einstein, 1921, 9 ; tr. 1954, 237). The same assumption must be made
for clocks, or, more specifically, for atomic clocks: “The existence of sharp spectral
lines is a convincing experimental proof” (Einstein, 1921, 9; tr. 1954, 238; my em-
phasis) of their Riemannian behavior. Against this assumption it could be objected
that rods and clocks are complex atomic structures, the behavior of which Einstein,
1921, 9; tr. 1954, 237 cannot be simply read off from observation, but is of necessity
“theory laden.”
Einstein could then recognize that someone is sub specie aeterni right who, like
Weyl or Eddington, argues that rods and clocks are not “irreducible elements” but
“composite structures,” which must “not play any independent part” in theoretical
physics /Einstein, 1921, 8; tr. 1954, 236; my emphasis). However, Einstein could
also point out that, sub specie temporis, i.e., “in the present stage of development of
theoretical physics,” he was justified from starting from the plausible assumption
about their behavior, even if it is external to the framework of general relativity
(Einstein, 1921, 8; tr. 1954, 237; my emphasis).
The issue at stake is then the presupposition that the ratio of clock periods and
rod lengths is an absolute constant. Precisely this, Einstein observes, “enables us to
speak with meaning of the mensuration, in Riemann’s sense of the word” (Einstein,
1921, 8; tr. 1954, 237; my emphasis).
Thus the reference to Poincaré cannot be taken “literally,” but must be inter-
preted at most as an analogy. One can assume as a fact, ? la Helmholtz, that the
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ratio of two atoms is the same whenever they are compared, as Einstein did, or
decide, to adopt a sort of Poincarean strategy, to save non-Riemannian geometry,
by blaming the apparent Riemannian behavior of atomic clocks on the dynamical
mechanism of an adjustment to the world curvature (Weyl, 1921a,c).
Einstein’s formula G + P seems then to allude to such a strategy of “doubling
geometry” (Vizgin, 1994, 146): an unobservable “world geometry”—as Edding-
ton called it (Eddington, 1921)—which is not “the geometry of actual space and
time” (but from which the unification of electromagnetism and gravitation may
be achieved) is introduced on a deeper level of stratification with respect to the
“natural geometry,” which is the “geometry of Riemann and Einstein, not Weyl’s
generalized geometry” (Eddington, 1921, 121).
5.3. Schlick’s Influence on Reichenbach’s Conversion to Conventionalism.
The background of Geometrie und Erfahrung (cf. Ryckman, 2005, §3.5) must not
have been not difficult to guess even if Einstein did not mention his real inter-
locutors by name. Schlick’s review of Geometrie und Erfahrung (Schlick, 1921),
clearly shows that he was aware of it. Schlick points out that Einstein’s theory of
measurement presupposes that “two measuring rods are always and overall equally
long, if they once and somewhere were found as equal” (Schlick, 1921). As Schlick
remarks, this condition is “confirmed by experience,” even if Weyl has “tried to
drop it” (Schlick, 1921). Thus, Schlick was not only as well-aware of Weyl’s theory
as was Reichenbach, and but also that this theory was the polemical goal of Ein-
stein’s lecture. However, unlike Reichenbach, never attempted a real confrontation.
On the contrary, Schlick, supported by Einstein’s flattering reference to his book in
Geometrie und Erfahrung, could apparently not restrain himself from taking Ein-
stein’s reference to Poincaré as a confirmation that the Helmholtz–Poincaré debate
was the right framework from which the new theory could be understood as he had
suggested.
Schlick’s Erläuterungen to Helmholtz’s writings on geometry (Helmholtz, 1921,
tr. Helmholtz, 1977)—which he edited in 1921 together with Paul Hertz in 1921—
show how Einstein’s formula G+P could be integrated with apparent success into
the framework of the discussion of Helmholtz and Poincaré of the role of rigid bodies
in the foundations of geometry (Pulte, 2006): Helmholtz claimed that which bodies
are “actually” rigid depends on the laws of physics, so that “real” physical geometry
is discovered by empirical investigation; Poincaré objected that one can always
change the laws of physics, in order to preserve the simplest Euclidean geometry. In
reality it should be argued—“as by Einstein in Geometrie und Erfahrung” (Schlick’s
commentary in Helmholtz, 1921, **; n. 31; tr. 1977, 31; n. 31)—, that one chooses
certain bodies as rigid, i.e. which geometry holds in the actual world, if this choice
leads to the simplest possible physics.
Ironically, one can look at Paul Hertz’s Erläuterungen to Helmholtz’s more tech-
nical papers to understand why Schlick’s appropriation of Einstein’s formula G+P
was based on a misunderstanding. Schlick seems to have not given enough philo-
sophical relevance to the difference between “Riemann [who] gives an elementary
law (differential law)” and “Helmholtz [who] conversely formulates his axioms for
systems of finitely separated points” (Hertz’s commentary in Helmholtz, 1921, 57; n.
1; tr. 1977, 58; n. 1)3. One has to distinguish on the one hand the “Helmholtzian
3It might be interesting to compare this passage with that of Einstein’s quoted above on p. 11
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axiom”—which was “criticized and completed by Sophus Lie with help of group
theory” (Hertz’s commentary in Helmholtz, 1921, 57; n. 1; tr. 1977, 58; n. 1)—
according to which the volume of finite bodies does not depend on position, from
that of Riemann in which only that the length of infinitesimally rigid rods does not
depend on position. It is worth quoting Hertz’s commentary at length:
We therefore have to emphasize, as an especially important feature of
Helmholtz’s axiom, the following proposition: two point systems which
once coincide can also be brought into coincidence in every other situa-
tion, even when each is connected to another system. As is known, Rie-
mann considered a more general case: finite rigid bodies need not always
be movable, but infinitely small bodies should be able to go anywhere;
thus, in other words, the axioms stated here by Helmholtz should hold
for infinitesimal rigid bodies: there should be a line element independent
of the path. In this [Riemann’s axiom] Weyl* sees a vestige of preju-
dices about geometry “at a distance”. The length relationship between
two extensions could depend upon the path along which an infinitesimal
comparing rod was brought from one to the other. H. Reichenbach** can
already seek a further generalization: that namely a material extension,
after a rotation about itself, might no longer coincide with the same ex-
tension as previously (Hertz’s commentary in Helmholtz, 1921, 57; n. 1;
tr. 1977, 58; n. 1).
* See e.g. Raum, Zeit, Materie [Weyl, 1921b], §16; Math. Zeitschr.
2 (1918) [Weyl, 1918c]. ** Relativitatstheorie und Erkenntnis a priori
[’Relativity theory and a priori knowledge’], Berlin, 1921, p. 76. [Re-
ichenbach, 1920a, 76]4
As we have seen, Einstein in Geometrie und Erfarung—as Schlick himself noticed
in his review—was precisely concerned with the validity of Riemann’s axiom, since,
needless to say, Helmholtz’s axiom is not valid in spaces of variable curvature.
It is then surprising that Reichenbach himself—who Hertz mentions for hav-
ing proposed a possible extension of Riemannian geometry—in his review of the
Schlick–Hertz edition of Helmholtz’s writings, though praising the technical parts
of Hertz’s presentation (Reichenbach, 1921b, 422), could see the main result of
Helmholtz’s reflections on geometry in the connection “of the axiom of congruence
with the behavior of rigid bodies; even Poincaré,” Reichenbach concludes, “has not
expressed conventionalism more clearly” (Reichenbach, 1921b, 421).
5.4. Reichenbach’s Capitulation to Schlick’s Conventionalism. Reichen-
bach’s capitulation to Schlick’s philosophy could have not been more unconditional,
as one can realize reading between the lines of his beautiful 1922 overview of contem-
porary philosophical discussions about relativity (Reichenbach, 1922a). Reichen-
bach awkwardly tries to convince himself and his readers that his previous opinion
that the metric “expresses an objective property of reality,” “does not contradict
conventionalism” (Reichenbach, 1922a, 356; tr. 1978, I, 34f). In 1920 he simply
“forgot to add the proposition of the definition of the metric through rigid bodies”
(Reichenbach, 1922a, 356; tr. 1978, I, 34f; my emphasis). When this definition is
added, one has to agree with Schlick that “a metric emerges only after the physical
laws have been established (the P of Einstein’s formula)”(Reichenbach, 1922a, 356;
4The footnotes are Paul Hertz’s. Reichenbach’s passage to which Hertz refers us was quoted
above on p. 18
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tr. 1978, I, 34f); in principle one can change the metric “provided one changes the
laws of physics correspondingly” (Reichenbach, 1922a, 356; tr. 1978, I, 34f).
Thus, Reichenbach took it for granted that Einstein’s formula G+ P should be
read the context of 19th century conventionalism: In principle it is always possible
to make rigid bodies agree with any kind of geometry (G) we please by changing the
physical laws (P ) that govern their behavior, for instance by introducing a “field
of force” (Reichenbach, 1922a, 365-366) that suitably deforms all our measuring
instruments. Anticipating the main lines of his future philosophy of geometry, Re-
ichenbach reached the conclusion that “[d]epending on the choice of the field of force,
one gets a different geometry” (Reichenbach, 1922a, 365-366). In this sense, Re-
ichenbach points out, “material objects do not define a single geometry, but a “class
of geometries; this is precisely the meaning of conventionalism’. By changing the
definition of rigidity, a chagne that can be interpreted as the effect of a force,‘[o]ne
obtains then a Riemannian geometry of different measure-determination”. (Re-
ichenbach, 1922a, 365-366).
This understanding of Einstein’s formula, however, is rather puzzling. It is
sufficient to consider the point that Reichenbach made immediately thereafter. Re-
ichenbach remarks that the entire class of Riemannian geometries—of both the
Euclidean and the non-Euclidean sort—“is based on an axiom, that denotes an
empirical fact [einen empirischen Tatbestand],” the axiom that “two natural mea-
suring rods, which can be brought to superposition once, can be superposed again
after they have been transported along different paths.” The assuption of the “trans-
portability of rods” is “the axiom of the class of Riemannian geometries”, that is
“the possible geometries according to Einstein” (Reichenbach, 1922a, 366).
After Weyl’s clarification (Weyl, 1921c, 475),5 Reichenbach started to recognize
that one of Weyl’s main achievements is precisely to have shown that “the ax-
iom of the Riemann class for natural measuring rods” is not“logically necessary,”
(Reichenbach, 1922a, 368). While Einstein had “simply accepted the univocal trans-
portability of natural measuring-rods” as a given fact, Weyl urged “that the validity
of this axiom,” should be “understood as an outflow of a law of nature” (Reichen-
bach, 1922a, 368). Reichenbach did not find Weyl’s explanation of the univocal
“transportability [Uebertragbarkeit] through the adaptation of the measuring-rods
to the curvature of the world” (Reichenbach, 1922a, 368, n. 1) satisfying. However,
he had to admit that Weyl’s speculative argument had clearly put the finger on a
hidden presupposition that Einstein’s theory had uncritically assumed.
What Reichenbach, however, failed to appreciate is that Einstein’s G+P should
be understood precisely on the background of Weyl’s (and Eddington’s) strategy
of “doubling geometry,” by opposing the apparent Riemannian natural geometry,
forced by mechanism of the adjustment, to the real non-Riemannian ether or world-
geometry and not to the choice between classes of Riemannian geometries, between
the Euclidean and the non-Euclidean geometries. By the contrary, by 1922 (Re-
ichenbach, 1922b) the essential lines of Reichenbach’s conventionalism were already
written in stone. The solution of the problem of space, Reichenbach claims, is to
be found “only in this conception we call conventionalism, which goes back to
Helmholtz and Poincaré” (Reichenbach, 1922b, 40; tr. 2006, 135).
Again, Reichenbach could consider this conclusion acceptable only by blurring
what Hertz had called the “Helmholtzian axiom” with the “Riemanniann axiom”.
5See above on p. 18
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On the one hand he believes that the main philosophical lesson of general relativity
is that “[t]he definition of congruence is . . . arbitrary, and what is congruent in
one geometry is not necessarily congruent in another” (Reichenbach, 1922b, 33; tr.
2006; 127; my emphasis). On the other hand Reichenbach also points out that
“[t]his definition of congruence is arbitrary, but it is uni-vocal, and it entails that
two rigid rods that are congruent at a point remain congruent at all points. This is
an axiom that we can consider to be experimentally well confirmed” (Reichenbach,
1922b, 35; tr. 2006; 129; my emphasis).
In this way, however Reichenbach completely confuses what he had so carefully
distinguished in his first 1920 monograph. There cannot be any univocal definition
of congruence of bodies in Riemannian manifolds of variable curvature, where the
“Helmholtzian axiom” does not hold, and two bodies that are congruent here, in
general, cannot be reproduced in another location. In all Riemannian manifolds
(with variable or constant curvature), however, there is an arbitrary, but univocal
definition of the unit of length: two unit rods have the same length wherever they
are compared.
As Reichenbach rightly points out, although rather in passing, in his more tech-
nical 1924 monograph (Reichenbach, 1924), in this respect Weyl had raised a rele-
vant philosophical problem. He realized that we cannot simply accept this “fact”
as a fortunate circumstance: “it cannot be an accident that two measuring rods
are equal at every place in a neighborhood comparison” (Reichenbach, 1924, 64;
tr. 1969, 91; my emphasis); Weyl had therefore rightly required that “this fact
must be explained” (Reichenbach, 1924, 64; tr. 1969, 91; my emphasis). A similar
passage from a 1925 paper (Reichenbach, 1925) of Reichenbach makes this point
eloquentely:
The word adjustment, first used in this way by Weyl, is a very good char-
acterization of the problem. It cannot be a coincidence if two measuring
rods placed next to each other are of the same length regardless of their
location; it must be explained as an adjustment to the field in which the
measuring rods are embedded as test bodies. Just as a compass needle
adjusts to its immediately surrounding magnetic field by changing its
direction, measuring rods and clocks adjust their units of measure to the
metric field. ...
Of course, the answer can only arise from a detailed theory of matter
about which we have not the least idea; it must explain why the accumu-
lation of certain field loci of particular density, i.e., the electrons, express
the metric of the surrounding field in a simple manner. The word “ad-
justment” here thus only means a problem without providing an answer
... Once we have this theory of matter, we can explain the metrical be-
havior of material objects; but at present the explanation from Einstein’s
theory is as poor as Lorentz’s or the classical terminology. (Reichenbach,
1925, 48; my emphasis; tr. 2006, my emphasis)**
It is difficult to disagree with Reichenbach’s remark that Weyl’s speculative
theory of the adjustment of rods and clocks to the world curvature only allows
the problem to emerge, but it does not furnish a plausible solution. However, it
is just as hard not be puzzled by the fact that Reichenbach did not realize that
it was precisely this problem that Einstein intended to address in Geometrie und
Erfahrung: at the present stage of development of physics, in absence of a theory
of matter, general relativity can only assume as a fortunate circumstance that
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the dimensions of those atomic structures that we use as rods and clocks do not
depend on what happened to them in the past. This is indeed a poor explanation
as Reichenbach rightly notices; in principle it would be preferable to have theory
that can account for this remarkable behavior. Einstein mentioned Poincaré not in
order to support classical conventionalism, but to allude to Weyl’s and Eddington’s
conceptually more rigorous, but physically less advantageous attitude toward the
relations between geometry and physics (Eddington, 1923, ch. 7).
6. The Assessment of Reichenbach’s Conventionalism as a the
Merging of the Helmholtzian and the Riemannian Traditions
6.1. Einstein’s Rhetorical Use of the Helmholtz-Poincaré Opposition.
Einstein had returned to the issue of the epistemological status of rods and clocks
again in his July 1923 Nobel prize lecture. He insisted that “it would be logically
more correct to begin with the whole of the laws” (Einstein, 1923a, 3; tr. 1923/1967,
484; my emphasis) and not with an “artificially isolated part” such as rods and
clocks (Einstein, 1923a, 3; my emphasis). However, “we are not . . . sufficiently
advanced in our knowledge of Nature’s elementary laws to adopt this more perfect
method” (Einstein, 1923a, 3; tr. Einstein, 1923/1967, 484; my emphasis). Einstein
here is more explicit that in Geometrie und Erfahrung about who he was referring
us to: “At the close of our considerations we shall see that in the most recent stud-
ies there is an attempt, based on ideas by Levi-Civita, Weyl, and Eddington, to
implement that logically purer method” (Einstein, 1923a, 3; tr. 1923/1967, 484; my
emphasis), in their attempt “to replace Riemannian metric geometry” (Einstein,
1923a, 3; tr. 1923/1967, 484; my emphasis) with a more general one from which
the “identity between the gravitational field and the electromagnetic field” might
be derived (Einstein, 1923a, 3).
There is then evidence, Einstein’s philosophical reflections on the role of rods
and clocks in general relativity, dispersed in several writings of that time, must
be understood against this background. In a 1924 review (Einstein, 1924) of a
book by a minor Neo-Kantian (Elsbach, 1924; cf. Howard, 1990, 2010), Einstein
distinguishes two different “standpoints” on the question about the relation be-
tween geometry and experience: according to “standpoint A,” the “concept of the
interval corresponds to something experiential”; on the other hand, according to
“standpoint B,” to the “practically-rigid measuring body is accorded no reality”
“only geometry with physical sciences taken together” can be compared with ex-
perience (Einstein, 1924, 1690-1691). In a brief paper published one year later,
Nichteuklidische Geometrie und Physik (Einstein, 1925), Einstein expressly attrib-
uted the standpoint A to Poincaré and standpoint B to Helmholtz (Einstein, 1925,
253, tr. in Pesic, 2007, 161).
Einstein did not hide his sympathy for the latter, without whom, he claimed,
“the formulation of relativity theory would have been practically impossible” (Ein-
stein, 1925, 253, tr. in Pesic, 2007, 161). The Logical Empiricists could apparently
find here the umpteenth confirmation of their reading of Einstein’s work. How-
ever, once again, Einstein’s praise of the Helmholtzian attitude toward geometry—
that nearly literally reproduces his appreciation for practical geometry in Geome-
trie und Erfahrung6— cannot be taken at face value. It is the “chain of thought
6See above on p. 19
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Weyl–Eddington–Schouten” (letter to Besso,5.6.1925 Einstein, 1972, 204) to which
Einstein—with growing skepticism—was alluding.
The names of Helmholtz and Poincaré are used to symbolize in a brief non-
technical account published on a literary magazine, the Deutsche Literaturzeitung,
two different approaches toward the relationship between geometry and physics.
Einstein had assumed a sort of “Helmholtzian” attitude, by accepting a res facti,
that we happen to live in a world in which the relative periods of clocks and the
relative lengths of rods do not depend on their histories. Weyl and Eddington
had challenged him from a more critical “Poincaréian” point of view, by raising a
questio iuris question, by asking with what right one admits such a presupposition
in general relativity, if the latter has nothing to say about the behavior of rods and
clocks.
As Einstein put it in an article of the Encyclopedia Britannica, there are the
“consistent thinkers” (like Weyl or Eddington), who rightly consider it preferable
“to allow the content of experience [Erfahrungsbestände] to correspond to geometry
and physics conjointly” (Einstein, 1926, 609). On the other hand, there are those
who, like Einstein himself, at the present time stick to a more pragmatic interpreta-
tion of geometry as the study of the “laws regulating the positions of rigid bodies”
(Einstein, 1926, 609).
The reference to the role played by “rigid bodies” in geometry must not be
understood in the framework of 19th century conventionalism. It refers again to
“the Riemannian restriction”—as Eddington calls it in the same 1926 edition of the
Encyclopedia Britannica, (Eddington, 1926, 907)—about the the result of the com-
parison of units of length at a distance: “The assumption of Riemannian geometry,”
Eddington writes, “is that the result does not depend on the intermediate steps the
route of transfer” (Eddington, 1926, 907). As Eddington points out, this is however
“an assumption, not an a priori necessity” (Eddington, 1926, 907). One may claim
that such an assumption is experimentally well confirmed, so that “the geometry
of space and time is strictly Riemannian as Einstein supposed” (Eddington, 1926,
908). However, the “experimental verification only extends to a limited degree of
accuracy” (Eddington, 1926, 907). It should be preferable to regard the “Riemann-
ian restriction” as “a deduction not an axiom of our geometry” (Eddington, 1926,
908).
6.2. Reichenbach on Riemann and Helmholtz. It is interesting to notice that
Reichenbach, in his classic Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre, which may have al-
ready been finished in 1926 (cf. the letter to Schlick cited in Schlick, 2006, vol.
6, 175), was completely aware of the fact that “the comparison of two units of
lengths at different locations” (Reichenbach, 1928, 24-25; tr. 1958, 17) is a prob-
lematic issue. Reichenbach’s analysis reveals how here “definitions and empirical
statements are interconnected” (Reichenbach, 1928, 24; tr. 1958, 16) The choice of
a rod as unit rod is of course conventional, we could agree on the Paris meter or on
something else. However, Reichenbach pinpoints that “it is an observational fact
[beobachtbare Tatsache], formulated in an empirical statement [Erfahrungssatz]”
(Reichenbach, 1928, 24; tr. 1958, 16; my emphasis) that two measuring rods equal
in length in Paris will be found equal at every other spatial point. It would be
possible to imagine a world, in which “[i]f two of these copies were transported and
compared locally, they would be different in length” if compared elsewhere (Re-
ichenbach, 1928, 24; tr. 1958, 17). In such a world “a special definition of the unit
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of length would have to be given for every space point.” (Reichenbach, 1928, 24; tr.
1958, 17; my emphasis) We simply happen to live in the fortunate world in which
units of length are reproducible everywhere.
As Reichenbach points out, this “physical fact makes the convention univocal
[eindeutig],” i.e., independent of the path of transportation (Reichenbach, 1928,
24; tr. 1958, 17; my emphasis). The choice ofthe unit of measure is a matter
of convention, but the statement about the “univocalness [Eindeutigkeit] of the
convention is . . . empirically verifiable and not a matter of choice” (Reichenbach,
1928, 25; tr. 1958, 17; my emphasis). Reichenbach refers us to §46 of the book for
more clarification, a reference that, curiously, survived in the English translation,
where, however, §46 was suppressed. It is precisely there that Reichenbach discusses
at length Weyl’s theory, that is, the theory that revealed the contingency of this
empirically verifiable fact.
As we have seen, the error at the basis of Reichenbach’s geometrical convention-
alism can be easily seen in an attempt to extend this reasoning to the notion of
congruence. In the general case of a world endowed with a geometry of variable
curvature, there is no “univocal,” i.e., position-independent, definition of congru-
ence on which all its inhabitants may come to agree: two finite bodies which are
congruent in a flat part of space, cannot have this congruence reproduced in a
curved part of the same space. In such a world there might be, however, a univocal
definition of the unit of measure: the inhabitants of different regions of the world
may agree in using the same units, so that they can compare the length of lines
that they measure. If they find the length in question is 5, they may decide once
and for all whether 5 centimeters, 5 kilometers, 5 light years, etc., are meant.
Again, Reichenbach confuses the “Hemlmholtzian axiom” of the independence of
the congruence of bodies from position, with the “Riemannian axiom” of the inde-
pendence of the length of lines, chains of rods, that connect two points, from posi-
tion. Unfortunately, Reichenbach elevates this confusion to a philosophical agenda:
“[w]hile Riemann prepared the way for an application of geometry to physical re-
ality by his mathematical formulation of the concept of space. Helmholtz laid the
philosophical foundations” (Reichenbach, 1928, 48; tr. 1958, 35). In particular “he
recognized the connection of the problem of geometry with that of rigid bodies”
(Reichenbach, 1928, 48; tr. 1958, 35). For this reason, according to Reichenbach,
“Helmholtz’s epistemological lectures must therefore be regarded as the source of
modern philosophical knowledge of space” (Reichenbach, 1928, 48; tr. 1958, 35)
The Helmholtzian and Riemannian traditions have been blurred into one single
line of development: “The solution to the problem of space described here is to
be attributed principally to the work of Riemann, Helmholtz, Poincaré, and Ein-
stein” (Reichenbach, 1929b, 60; tr. Reichenbach, 1978, 179; my emphysis). General
relativity, however, cannot be regarded as the heir of this mathematical tradition
simply because, as we have tried to show, such a tradition never existed. Poincaré
explicitly excluded the Riemannian geometries of variable curvature from his con-
ventionalism, precisely because they were at odds with the Helmholtzian axiom
based on the existence of rigid bodies and its group theoretical definition furnished
by Lie. Reichenbach not only completely neglected the group theoretical implica-
tions of the work of Helmholtz and of Poincaré (Friedman, 1995), most of all he
did not appreciate philosophically the fact that Riemann’s work evolved along a
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different non-geometrical tradition whose geometrical significance re-emerged only
after general relativity in Levi-Civita’s notion of the parallel transport of vectors.
Precisely because he did not appreciate the difference between these two tradi-
tions, Reichenbach could simply delude himself that, even if “there are not rigid
bodies” in general relativistic space–time, the “definition” of congruence can be
redirected to “infinitesimal measuring instruments” (Reichenbach, 1928, 286; tr.
1958, 250). However, we clearly cannot stipulate arbitrarily which rods of infini-
tesimal lengths are rigid and which clocks of infinitesimal period can be regarded
as ideal clocks Torretti, 1983, 238-239. As we have seen, general relativity is built
precisely on the Riemannian assumption that the relative lengths and periods of
infinitesimal rods and clocks are not affected by the presence of a gravitational
field. Again, Reichenbach’s geometrical conventionalism confuses the definition of
congruence with the choice of the unit of measure, with the norm of the ds as the
unit interval, two issues that paradoxically appear clearly distinct in Reichenbach’s
own semi-technical presentation. Which atomic period we use as a unit clock, “[f]or
instance, the linear unit may be defined by means of the wave length of the red
cadmium line,” (Reichenbach, 1929b, 30; tr. 1978, I, 161) is of course conventional.
One can use another atom, let’s say an atom of sodium with a yellow emitting line,
but this would leave the geometry of space–time unaffected. On the other hand,
that the relative periods of atomic clocks is the same wherever they are compared, is
a fact, which “is taught to us by experience,” it is the fact at the basis of Riemann-
ian geometry: “For the fact that the objects in question are similar is, of course,
not established by definition but is a fact that must be discovered” (Reichenbach,
1929b, 30; tr. 1978, I, 161).
The possibility of measurements in Riemann–Einstein geometry presupposes this
empirically discovered “special property” of our rods and clocks that have always
the same relative length and relative rate of ticking wherever they are compared, so
that “there is no need to store a special unit at a definite location.” It is a property
that characterizes all Riemannian geometries (Euclidean and non-Euclidean). The
fundamental question is then the following: “What would happen if the measur-
ing rods would not posses the mentioned special property [Vorzugseingeinschaft]?”
(Reichenbach, 1928, 332).
Reichenbach unfortunately raised this question precisely in the above mentioned
§46, of the appendix of his book (Reichenbach, 1928, 331-373), a paragraph that did
not even make it to the English translation. However, this was exactly the question
Einstein, Weyl, and Eddington were addressing in their debate about the role of
rods and clocks in general relativity. In spite of Einstein’s, didactically effective,
but misleading references, the framework from which this issue can be understood
is not provided by Helmholtz’s and Poincaré’s appeal to rigid bodies in geometry,
but by Levi-Civita’s re-geometrization of Riemann’s work via the notion of parallel
transport of vectors. It was Weyl’s attempt—which Reichenbach discussed at length
in the appendix—to put the direction and the length of vectors on an equal footing
(Afriat, 2009) that let emerge the contingency of a central feature of Riemannian
geometry from which the very destiny general relativity as a physical theory stands
or falls.
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7. Einstein’s Late Reflections on Rods and Clocks in General
Relativity and his Last Dialogue with Reichenbach
7.1. Einstein, Weyl and Eddington after 1930. By that time, after the dis-
covery of an “absolute length” hmc in the Dirac theory of the electron, Weyl had
actually already completely abandoned his 1918 gauge theory (Weyl, 1931). The
material electron had assumed the role of world-radius as an absolute standard of
measure (Weyl, 1934). It began to become clear (London, 1927) that the gauge
invariance ties the electromagnetic field to the Schrödinger–Dirac field of the elec-
tron ψ (Dirac, 1928a,b) and not to the gravitational field gik as Weyl had originally
thought (Weyl, 1929a,b). Weyl’s invitation to abandon all “geometrical capers
[Luftsprünge]” (Weyl, 1931, 343); cf. Scholz, 2006), was, however, not followed by
Einstein, who, as is well known, in the subsequent years tried several geometrical
paths in the search for a unified theory of gravitation and electromagnetism, which
invariably led to a dead end.
Reichenbach himself had presented, in two very readable semi-popular papers
(Reichenbach, 1929a,c), Einstein’s last attempt in which another parallelism, the
“Fernparallelismus” (Sauer, 2006), takes the place of the usual “Riemannian” Levi-
Civita’s parallelism, introducing a curvature-free, but non-Euclidean space–time,
with non vanishing torsion (the measure of the closure failure of a parallelogram
made up of two vectors and their reciprocal parallel transports).
Around 1930, Einstein himself presented his theory to a larger public in some
semi-popular contributions (Einstein, 1929, 1930a,b,c), in which he showed increas-
ing epistemological confidence in the power of mathematical speculation (Dongen,
2010). Material particles should appear as solutions of the field laws (portions of
the field with high density without singularities), from which ideally also the be-
havior of rods and clocks as atomic structures should be derived. However, Einstein
admits, “[a]s long as the questions are not satisfactorily solved, there will be a jus-
tified doubt as to whether such far-reaching deductive methods may be granted to
physics at all” (Einstein, 1930a,b,c, tr. in Pesic, 2007, 177)
To describe the actual provisional status of theoretical physics, Einstein resorted
again to the language of “rigid bodies.” In his 1933 Herbert Spencer lecture at the
Oxford University, Einstein makes clear that, epistemologically, theoretical physics
“is really exactly analogous to Euclidean geometry,” which is a formal axiomatic
system on the one hand, but on the other might be regarded as “the science of the
possibilities of the relative placing of actual rigid bodies” (Einstein, 1933, 165). It
is against the background of such a “logical parallelism of geometry and theoretical
physics,” (Einstein, 1933, 165), that Einstein insists that it has been a “fatal [ver-
hängnisvolle] error”—as he put it in Physik und Realität (Einstein, 1936)—that this
conception of geometry as a branch of physics “has fallen into oblivion” (Einstein,
1936, 321, tr. 356). (Einstein, 1936, 321, tr. 356).
The epistemological problem Einstein was addressing is put in an equally popular
but more direct way in Eddington’s 1938 lectures at Trinity College, Cambridge:
We notice that relativity theory has to go outside its own borders to
obtain the definition of length, without which it cannot begin. It is
the microscopic structure of matter which introduces a definite scale of
things Since we have separated molar physics from microscopic physics
primarily out of consideration of the grossness of our sensory equipment,
it would be unreasonable to expect to find it complete in itself. We can
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only make it logically complete as far as the point where its roots stretch
down into physics as a whole.
. . .
The secret of the union of molar and microscopic physics—of relativity
theory and quantum theory—is “the full circle”. . . . Generally we enter
on the circle at the junction now under discussion, where relativity theory
takes its standard of length from quantum theory (Eddington, 1939, 76-
77)
As we have seen, general relativity must at last rely on a “quantum-specified
standard . . . reproducible at the remotest times and places” (Eddington, 1939, 79).
But it is at least plausible that “the quantum-specified standard does not provide an
exact definition of length in strong electric or magnetic fields,” since it not exactly
reproducible in those circumstances (Eddington, 1939, 79). It is “quantum theory”
that must “ultimately be able to calculate precisely how much a crystal standard
expands or contracts when placed in a magnetic field, or how a wave-length is
modified” (Eddington, 1939, 81). Only from the standpoint of “physics as a whole”
(Eddington, 1939, 76), as a union of molar and microscopic physics, can we then
expect an epistemologically satisfying solution of the problem. At the present state,
however, “appeal must be made to quantum theory for the definition of the interval
ds, which is the starting-point of relativity theory” (Eddington, 1941, 693).
In those years, e.g., in his Yale lectures in 1930–1931 (Weyl, 1932) and in Mind
and Nature 1934 (Weyl, 1934), Weyl also never tired of emphasizing that, in prin-
ciple, “only the theoretical system as a whole” should “be confronted with expe-
rience” (Weyl, 1932, 78), a system in which “all parts of physics and geometry
finally coalesce into one indissoluble unity” (Weyl, 1934, 45). In his 1949 English
augmented-translation (Weyl, 1949) of his 1927 monograph (Weyl, 1927), Weyl
insisted that the behavior of rods and clocks “by which Einstein measures the fun-
damental quantity ds2” should come out “as a remote consequence of the fully
developed theory” (Weyl, 1949, 288). Geometry and physics can only be “put to
the test as a whole” (Weyl, 1949, 134).
7.2. Einstein, Reichenbach and the Anonymous non-Positivist. In his Au-
tobiographical Notes (Einstein, 1949a) for Schilpp’s Library of Living Philosophers,
which came out in the same year, Einstein again seems to embrace in princin-
ple such an epistemological ideal, although defending the legitimacy of his more
opportunistic attitude. As Einstein famously pointed out, “in a certain sense, is
inconsistent,” to consider measuring rods and clocks “as theoretically self-sufficient
entities” (Einstein, 1949a, 57); “strictly speaking” they “would have to be rep-
resented as solutions of the basic equations (objects consisting of moving atomic
configurations)” (Einstein, 1949a, 57).. However, he still pragmatically recognizes
that “it was better to permit such inconsistency—with the obligation, however, of
eliminating it at a later stage of the theory” (Einstein, 1949a, 57).
The issue Einstein was raising, as he makes particularly clear in the final “Re-
marks,” (Einstein, 1949b) were the same he had been concerned with thirty years
earlier:
Everything finally depends upon the question: Can a spectral line be con-
sidered as a measure of a “proper time”, (Eigen-Zeit) ds = gikdxidxk (if
one takes into consideration regions of cosmic dimensions)? Is there such
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a thing as a natural object which incorporates the “natural-measuring-
stick” independently of its position in four-dimensional space? The af-
firmation of this question made the invention of the general theory of
relativity psychologically possible; however this supposition is logically
not necessary (Einstein, 1949b, 685; last emphasis mine)
The fact that general relativity still assumes that there are “physical objects,
which (in the macroscopic field) measure the invariant ds”, shows that “a complete
theory of physics as a totality . . . does not yet exist” (Einstein, 1949b, 685); accord-
ing to Einstein, in a complete theory “the objects used as tools for measurement
do not lead an independent existence alongside of the objects implicated by the
field-equation” (Einstein, 1949b, 685)
Because of this, it was not particularly enlightening that Einstein, addressing
Reichenbach’s discussion (Reichenbach, 1949) of the question if “geometry . . . ver-
ifiable (viz., falsifiable) or not,” resorted to a imaginary dialogue that opposes “Re-
ichenbach, together with Helmholtz” on the one hand and Poincaré on the other
(Einstein, 1949b, 677-678). As is well known, the anonymous “Non-Positivist”—
who substitutes for Poincaré by the end of the dialogue—escapes this alterna-
tive by supporting the holistic claim that “no ‘meaning’”—in Reichenbach’s sense
(meaning=verifiability)—can be attributed to “the individual concepts and asser-
tions” but only “to the entire system,” (Einstein, 1949b, 677-678), i.e., only to “the
completely developed theory of relativity (which, however, does not yet exist at all as
a finished product)” (Einstein, 1949b, 677-678). It is of course not clear for whom
the non-Positivist stands (Howard, 1990), but it seems not overwhelmingly spec-
ulative to argue that the anonymous interlocutor shares Weyl’s and Eddington’s
epistemological stance.
The words with which Weyl, in late 1950 (Weyl, 1951), on the occasion of 50
years of general relativity, sketched his debate with Einstein in the 1920s seems to
confirm this reading. Even if Weyl has no intention to difened a “theory in which I
no longer bilieve”, he still argues that the theory had put general relativity in front
of a legitimante epistemological problem: “the definition” of the metric field “with
help of rods and clocks” can of course “only be regarded as a temporary connection
to the experience.” In principle, “it must be derived” from the laws of physics, “in
which relation the measurement results which are read off from those bodies stay
to the fundamental quantities of the theory” (Weyl, 1951, 81).
The contemporary reaction of logical empiricists to Einstein’s epistemological
remarks shows, however, that they still read them in the context of the age-old,
but still discussed problem (Hempel, 1945) of the choice between Euclidean or non-
Euclidean geometries. Reichenbach considered Einstein’s position as a “witty de-
fense of conventionalism” (Reichenbach, 1951, 135), to which he answered resorting
again to Helmholtz’s and Poincaré’s conceptual resources, from which he defended
his “verifiability theory of meaning” (Reichenbach, 1951). Rudolf Carnap’s 1956
preface to the English translation of Reichenbach’s classical 1928 monograph (Re-
ichenbach, 1958) considers the main achievement of Reichenbach precisely in having
established the connection of Poincaré’s work to that of Einstein (also see Carnap’s
1958 seminar on the foundations of physics published as Carnap, 1966).
7.3. The Discussion on the “Riemannian axiom” in the 1960s. It is then
not surprising that the entire long chapter dedicated to Weyl’s theory was omitted
by Maria Reichenbach and John Freund in their widely read English translation of
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Reichenbach’s masterpiece (Reichenbach, 1958) and remains untranslated to this
days (Coffa, 1979). This decision was of course comprehensible. Weyl’s theory
in his original form was physically untenable, as Weyl himself did not hesitate to
admit in occasion of the reiussue of his 1918 paper (cf. addenum to Weyl, 1918c,
published in Weyl, 1956, 192). However, the fact Weyl’s theory was regarded as
philosophically and epistemologically uninteresting is the sign of a more fundamen-
tal misunderstanding, a misunderstanding that, given the enormous influence of
Reichenabach’s book, might have not been free of consequences on the later devel-
opment of the philosophical investigation of space-time theories. Weyl’s failed 1918
attempt to unify gravitation and electricity had raised a fundamental epistemologi-
cal question about the status of the nothing but obvious Riemannanian behavior of
rods and clocks which provides general relativity with its empirical content. This is-
sue continued to play a not negligible role, in the foundational discussions of general
relativity in the physical community in the subsequent decades.
Just after the publication of Reichenbach’s book in English, the Irish physicist
John Lighton Synge, making a “a plea for chronometry” (Synge, 1959), suggested
introducing as the basis of general relativity the chronometric version of the “Rie-
mannian hypothesis” (Synge, 1960, 105), that is the “chronometric assumption
which makes space–time Riemannian” (Synge, 1960, 107): the ratio of frequencies
of atomic clocks is a “natural constant,” independent of the world-line on which the
observations are made (Synge, 1960, 106).
At about the same time, however, convinced of the epistemological shortcom-
ings of this approach, Robert F. Marzke (Marzke, 1959) and, a little later, Wolfgang
Kundt and Dieter Hoffmann (Kundt and Hoffman, 1962) attempted to construct
clocks using the reflection of light between two world-lines, without resorting to
complicated atomic structures (Marzke, 1959). As Marzke explains in 1964, in a
paper written with John A. Wheeler (Marzke and Wheeler, 1964), a theory should
be able to describe the behavior of its own probes. “The conceivability of alterna-
tive theories,” such as Weyl geometry, raised the question, “[h]ow accurately has
the Riemann postulate been tested” (Marzke and Wheeler, 1964, 59). General rela-
tivity assumes that “the ratio” of world-lines “is independent of the choice of route
of inter comparison” (Marzke and Wheeler, 1964, 58), but, from the epistemolog-
ical point of view, the inter-comparison should “be carried through without any
recourse to measuring rods or clocks of atomic constitution” (Marzke and Wheeler,
1964, 62). General relativity, “in and by itself” should provide “its own means for
defining intervals of space and time” without leaning on quantum theory. In this
spirit, Ehlers, Pirani, and Schlild (Ehlers, Pirani, and Schild, 1972) had famously
suggested the use of light rays and freely falling particles (following Weyl, 1921d)
instead of rods and clocks; however “an additional Riemannian axiom” (Ehlers,
Pirani, and Schild, 1972, 82) was still needed, to force the Streckenkrümmung to
vanish everywhere.
Thus, this debate reproduced at a higher level of sophistication the technical
and philosophical issue (Carrier, 1990; Coleman and Korté, 1995) that Einstein,
Weyl, and Eddington had faced some decades earlier. This confirms beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that precisely the role of the “Riemannian axiom” was at the heart
of Einstein’s reflections about rods and clocks: hence these reflections do not bear
any connection with the problem of whether the choice among various different
Riemannian geometries is conventional or empirical, as logical empiricists believed,
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a problem which, on the contrary, make sense only under the assumption of the
“Helmholtzian axiom” of free mobility. It is again a sign of a curious misunderstand-
ing that Reichenbach’s well-informed 1922 remarks on the Weyl-Einstein-Eddington
debate were omitted also from the 1878 English translation of his philosophical writ-
ings (Reichenbach, 1978) because—as the editors surprisingly point out— it was
“of no historical importance” (Reichenbach, 1978, I, 38)
8. Conclusion
Riemann’s and Helmholtz’s two brief writings on the foundation of geometry,
although ??? they had both undeniably an enormous influence on the history of
the sometimes stormy relationship between geometry and physics, undergo differ-
ent destinies. The intuitive attractiveness of Helmholtz’s conviction that spatial
measurement necessarily presupposes the rigid motions of bodies with the volumes
they fill initially hindered the full appreciation of Riemann’s more abstract and
general assumption that it is sufficient to assume the length of the paths between
any two points—relative to some standard interval—can be univocally determined.
Helmholtz’s approach was in fact immediately extremely successful; developed
technically by Lie’s work on continuous group, it was brought at the center of the
philosophical scene by the elegant prose of Poincaré’s popular writings; on the con-
trary, Riemmann’s approach somehow evolved subterraneusly from the inconspic-
uous work of Christoffel, to Ricci’s and Levi-Cvita’s absolute differential calculus,
and never made the headlines of the philosophical debate. It was general relativity
that rescue this mathematical tradition from the oblivion to which it would have
probably been consigned otherwise.
Using Logical Empiricism as a case study, this paper has tried to show that
the profound difference between these two traditions was never fully appreciated in
the philosophical debate a misunderstanding that had longstanding consequences
on the history of philosophy of science. Whereas the emergence of general relativ-
ity can be described as a process of progressive “emancipation” from the distant-
geometrical approach that dominated the “Helmholtzian tradition” to let emerge
the near-geometrical implications of the “Riemannian” one, early logical empiricists’
philosophy of space and time emerges on the contrary as as a sort of unfortunate
“collision”—to borrow Norton’s term (Norton, 1999)—of the “Riemannian” and the
“Helmholtzian” tradition. The logical empiricists tried to interpret Einstein’s new
approach to geometry and physics, the very expression of the Riemannian tradition,
projecting it on the background the Helmohltzian one.
With the mathematical technique developed by Riemann, Christoffel, Ricci and
Levi-Civita Einstein’s theory of gravitation inherited the tacit assumption, that,
once a unit of measure has been chosen once and for all, the length of world-lines
can be attributed a unique value, independent of the coordinate system chosen.
Einstein’s insistence against Weyl on the indispensability of rods and clocks in gen-
eral relativity pivoted precisely on the status of this “Riemannian assumption,”
that the ratio of any two world-lines is an absolute constant. Schlick and Reichen-
bach, however, mislead by some of Einstein’s remarks, tried to interpret Einstein’s
rods-and-clocks parlance under the light of the “Helmholtzian assumption,” of the
relation between congruence and the free mobility of rigid bodies. Helmholtz’s re-
quirement that the congruence of bodies should be independent of position was
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irremediably blurred with Riemann’s idea that the length of lines should be in-
dependent of position. To put it more intuitively: spatial measurements do not
require rigid bodies, but only inextensible threads (Freudenthal, 1956, 374, see also
Torretti, 1999, 163)
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